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During the 19th and early 20th century, Congress passed several laws intended to allow
average Americans the chance to acquire portions of the public domain for their own
benefit. However, contemporary observers and historians alike have noted that several of
these laws—especially the Homestead Act and the Timber and Stone Act—were instead
used by speculators and lumber companies to amass large landholdings by orchestrating
and purchasing fraudulent entries. Local historical tradition suggests that Eureka Lumber
Company, Bonners Ferry Lumber Company, and J. Neils Lumber Company employed
this tactic within the Kootenai National Forest (KNF), though the veracity of such claims
have never been tested. This study seeks to discover just how prevalent timber fraud may
have been in the Tobacco Plains region of the KNF. Using historical resources such as
patent records, county and General Land Office (GLO) tract books, and historic
newspapers, the study develops a research strategy to identify such parcels and determine
the scale to which such fraudulent activities occurred in the vicinity of Eureka, Montana.
Then, using existing survey and site data from the KNF alongside new investigations
from the 2020 field season, this project seeks to establish whether this pattern of behavior
left any detectable signature in the archaeological record. Together, these analyses reveal
an almost total lack of evidence supporting the hypothesis that local lumber companies
engaged in deliberately fraudulent practices in the Tobacco Plains.
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Chapter 1: The Legacy of Logging in the Tobacco Plains: An Introduction

From the moment Euroamerican settlers first began filtering into northwest
Montana, the lumber industry has been a mainstay of the local economy. As early as
1890 local boosters were waxing poetic over the timber resources of the Flathead and
Tobacco Valleys (Missoula Publish Company 1890), and town newspapers never ceased
to eagerly await the ocean of prosperity that the local forests would soon bring upon their
citizens (Tobacco Plains Journal 1903a, 1903c, 1903d, 1903e, 1903f, 1904a, 1904b,
1904c, 1904d, 1904e, 1904k, 1904m, 1904n, 1905d, 1905g, 1905i, 1905j, 1905m, 1906d,
1906i, 1906m, 1906r, 1906u, 1906v, 1906y, 1908a, 1908e). In the Tobacco Plains—a
broad, rolling prairie country surrounded by mountains and dense forests nestled against
the Canadian border in modern Lincoln County—the 1904 completion of the rerouted
Great Northern Railroad mainline (commonly referred to as the Columbia Falls Cut-Off)
meant that the market for timber products had finally arrived, and the residents responded
accordingly; by the end of 1904 there were five sawmills churning out lumber (Tobacco
Plains Journal 1904n).
Logging has, at times, provided up to 60% of the total jobs in Lincoln County; in
the town of Eureka, the central hub of the Tobacco Plains, residents claimed that the
Great Depression started five years early when the Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Company
shut down in 1924 (Fredlund 1992). Though no major mills operate in the area today, the
industry is intertwined with all aspects of the valley’s history and an inseparable piece of
local identity. For archaeologists working on the Kootenai National Forest (KNF),
logging appears as the single most important modifier of the forest landscape and a
fixture of historic archaeological study.
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The KNF contains nearly 2.5 million acres of land in northwest Montana,
enveloping the vast majority of Lincoln County; of the area encompassed by this study—
twelve townships south of Eureka—68% is under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.
While archaeological materials reflective of all aspects of the Tobacco Plains’
Euroamerican past appear frequently in most areas of the Forest (commonly referred to as
“historic;” though this term is debatable, it is adopted here for ease of use), those
associated with the lumber industry predominate: Of the 89 historic sites overlapped by
this research, 39 (44%) are explicitly logging-related.
However, the influence of the timber industry on the modern state of the KNF
goes even further: 24,773 acres covered by this study were once owned by a lumber
company. While this is only 14% of the total area, these lands contain 38% of the known
historic sites. Such tracts were also, by and large, not original inclusions to the National
Forest; they were exchanged by the various companies to the Forest Service in the early
1930s for unwanted lands elsewhere. Archaeologists working on official projects
regularly make note of this exchanged status during the process of background research,
while also compiling the names of dozens—sometimes hundreds—of individuals who
originally patented the same lands from the government at the turn of the twentieth
century. Researchers recording these two pieces of information side-by-side in countless
inventory reports and site forms naturally begin to consider two questions: (1) How were
the early lumber companies able to acquire so much land? and (2) Why were so many
settlers willing to sell?
One answer appears consistently across all levels of historical literature: Fraud.
The lumber industry of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was infamous for
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the illicit tactics it employed to acquire forested lands. Federal law was designed to
alienate the public domain to actual, bona fide settlers only, in keeping with the wellestablished Jeffersonian ideal that envisioned a nation of small, independent and selfsufficient farmers spanning from coast to coast. Large lumber concerns, without other
recourse, engaged in a suite of various creative and illegal schemes to purchase timbered
ground that ranged from paying their own employees to enter homesteads to filing
applications under fictitious names; one lumberman famously shipped trainloads of
schoolteachers across the country to take out claims on his behalf (Puter and Stevens
1908). The most egregious and well-known examples of such frauds occurred on the
Pacific coast, where the conditions of the temperate rain forest created stands of Douglas
fir, red cedar, and redwood trees larger than anywhere else in the world.
According to oral history and local writers such as Neils (1976), Thomas (1980),
Fredlund (1992), Miss (1994), Flanagan (2003), and Calvi (2004a), fraudulent land
grabbing was the norm for Tobacco Plains lumber companies as well. In search of the
best timber possible, corporations like the Bonners Ferry Lumber Company, Eureka
Lumber Company, and J. Neils Lumber Company allegedly sent scores of entrymen into
the forest to take out homesteads; these “dummies,” as they were known, built the bare
minimum improvements required by the law and eked out a living just long enough to
secure their patents and sell the land. The tiny, dilapidated cabins left over from these
dishonest occupations, according to many of the above researchers, still dot the
landscape; several such purported locations are recorded as archaeological sites (Fredlund
1992).
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This study seeks to discover just how prevalent timber fraud may have been in the
Tobacco Plains. As outlined in the following chapter, three fundamental approaches are
taken to address this issue: (1) A multi-scale historical review aimed at understanding the
wider context of United States land law, lumber production, and land fraud at a national,
regional, state, and local level; (2) an analysis of available records related to all land
claims purchased by local lumber companies and the design of a research methodology to
identify which claims were likely fraudulent; and (3) a review of current archaeological
data to determine if fraudulent activity is identifiable through material remains, and to
test the results of the aforementioned historical analysis. The first point is dealt with in
two chapters, which split the historical context into a review of federal land law followed
by a history of American logging and timber fraud. The final chapter, in two parts,
presents the historical and archaeological analysis of land acquisitions in the Tobacco
Plains. Pertaining to this final chapter, it is important to note that, due to the
idiosyncrasies of land law interpretation during the height of the timber craze—which are
explained in detail in later chapters—many of the methods that companies and
speculators resorted to were “technically” legal, though widely decried and popularly
considered fraudulent. When defining “fraud” for the purposes of this study, only those
activities which would have been prosecutable in a court of law are considered, as
opposed to the full spectrum of behaviors that might have been the target of public or
governmental opinion.
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Chapter 2: Methodological Considerations

Building the historical background necessary to understand the question of timber
land fraud in the Tobacco Plains requires a layered approach, as the interconnected
policies, practices, and ideologies that contributed to events on the ground were
developed along a wide continuum of scales, ranging from the local—even the
personal—to the county, state, regional, national, and sometimes international levels. A
history along these lines, by its very nature, cannot be exhaustive—that would simply be
beyond the scope of this study. But a literature review that touches upon each of the
above arenas of activity and draws out the pertinent details to the questions at hand is a
manageable task, and when completed and integrated provides a more-than adequate light
to examine the situation near Eureka.
Perhaps the greatest challenge in piecing together a history of land fraud in the
United States at any level is the general dearth of information. Broadly drawn searches
through academic journals and library catalogues yield few results, and the vast majority
of scholarly materials that happen to touch upon the subject do so only briefly. Though
most of these generally acknowledge that the widespread frauds of the 1880s through the
first decade of the 1900s were absolutely crucial to the development of government land
policy and the emergence of the modern National Forest system, they are by and large
focused on other aspects of forest history, and do not elaborate on the topic. Those that do
discuss such fraud in detail are frequently extremely dated: of 32 collected sources that
engage with it directly, 23 were published before 1968, with 16 of those—half of the
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total—predating 1928. Of the remaining 9, only Libecap (2007) and Gordon (2014)
postdate 1992.

Land Fraud on a National and Regional Scale
Most of the earliest sources located for this study that deal with timber fraud on
the national level are government reports; between 1903 and 1914, just one popular book
(Puter and Stevens 1908) and one journal article (Nelson 1909) appear amongst 10
different federal publications. These documents range from official congressional
correspondence (1903) and annual reports by the Chief Forester (1908, 1909, 1911, 1912,
1913, 1914) to high-profile governmental studies submitted by the Public Lands
Commission (1905), the National Conservation Committee (1909), and the Bureau of
Corporations (1913, 1914), which explored issues related to the public domain and land
fraud in detail. These latter three have provided the informational foundation for virtually
every other examination of the topic presented to date, and yield a wealth of
contemporary data and figures, as well as a comprehensive articulation of the complex
ideological context that characterized the government perspective on timber lands at the
turn of the twentieth century.
As the “Era of Magnificent Plundering” (Cameron 1924) came to a close by the
end of the 1910s, a series of book-length historical treatments emerged to explore the
history of the public lands in finer detail with the newly gained benefit of hindsight. John
Ise’s The United States Forest Policy was the first on the scene in 1920, dealing
especially with the nation’s relationship to its timber resources up to and beyond the
establishment of the National Forest system, while A History of the Public Land Policies
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by Benjamin H. Hibbard, published in 1924, took on the much broader scope of the
progression and consequences of U.S. land law in general. In 1928 Jenks Cameron
brought the focus back to the forests with The Development of Government Forest
Control in the United States, covering much of the same ground as Ise, but in a
distinctive, contrasting voice that is often saturated in opinion. Decades later, Paul W.
Gates achieved a rich, detailed, and definitive synthesis of each of these predecessors,
while expanding upon them significantly, in his 1968 History of Public Land Law
Development. All four, like the aforementioned reports they are largely based upon,
remain the most consistently cited historical materials across the entire field of ensuing
research, and as such necessarily constitute the building blocks of the large-scale history
presented here.
Since the height of fraudulent timber land activity occurred alongside the
migration of Midwestern lumbermen to the unprecedentedly vast forests of the Pacific
Northwest, any national history on the subject is essentially a regional history as well.
Puter and Stevens’ Looters of the Public Domain (1908)—a tell-all detailing decades of
rampant frauds perpetrated by Stephen A.D. Puter and his associates in Oregon and
California—was important enough across the country to help bring down two
Congressmen and a former Commissioner of the General Land Office (GLO) who were
implicated in the crimes, but it also provides a comprehensive and detailed look into the
unique conditions of the Pacific coastal region that fostered and encouraged such
industrial-scale fraud in the first place. Articles published in a variety of forest and
conservation journals by Appleman (1939), Robbins (1939), Yonce (1978), Messing
(1966), Libecap and Johnson (1979), and Libecap (2007) take similar bents that are
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intended broadly in their application, but in specifics are grounded in the Northwest.
Greg Gordon’s When Money Grew On Trees (2014)—the most recently published source
to deal with timber fraud in any detail—reverses these perspectives in his telling of the
story of A.B. Hammond and his meteoric rise from a general merchandise clerk in
Missoula, Montana, to one of the largest timberland owners in the United States. Gordon
elaborates on the extent of Hammond’s connections on a national level when necessary,
but keeps the narrative explicitly rooted in the people and places of Montana, Oregon,
and California at all times.
Other documents that deal with the Pacific Northwest region specifically are often
more difficult to locate, as they tend to be confined to narrowly circulated local histories
published by groups like state historical societies, or even unpublished manuscripts held
in libraries, archives, or other private collections; this is a problem that becomes even
more acute when researching at the local level. However, at least one small series
contains certain valuable insights into the difficulties of managing timber lands in the
region at large: Early Days in the Forest Service, published in four volumes between
1944 and 1976, contains remembrances and personal histories from a large number of
former forest rangers reaching back to the very beginning of Forest Service
administration in 1905. Though much of the content is irrelevant to the topic at hand,
many early rangers discuss the burden that they faced examining homestead and timber
and stone claims at the request of the GLO, an extremely time-consuming task that
increased dramatically after the passage of the Forest Homestead Act of 1906. Most
merely mention it in passing, but a few—particularly Joseph B. Halm and Clarence B.
Swim—make multiple references to the ongoing problem of ferreting out fraudulent
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claims, with Halm taking the time to describe one location in Northern Idaho in
considerable detail. Not only does this description contribute significantly to the general
context of timber fraud in the greater area, but it has important archaeological
implications that will be revisited later.

Land Fraud on a State and Local Scale
Transitioning from the national-macro level to the local-micro requires a
fundamentally different approach. As noted above, materials are often simply harder to
find, and are much less likely to be available digitally (a perfect example being the
Tobacco Plains Journal, the first newspaper printed in the study area, which today only
exists on microfilm at the Lincoln County Library in Eureka). The local situation also
requires significantly more explanation to make sense of specific conditions, since local
histories are highly variable and dependent upon such unique elements as geography,
natural resources, and even individual human beings. At the national scale it is not so
necessary to look beyond the subject in question, since the overall historical setting is
more generally known—though, in this case, writings by Bassman (1974), Cox (1981,
1985), Bunting (1994), Robbins (1994), and Gifford Pinchot (1937) help to fill in the
background on United States forest history beyond the specific topic of fraud. Locally,
however, the task is to build just such a general history, brief though it may be, within
which to examine the pertinent questions.
Stepping backward from the local to the state level as a starting point, an
approach somewhere in between the macro and the micro seems most appropriate. An
explanation of the overall history of Montana is plainly necessary to some degree, but
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what is truly important is an understanding of the emergence and development of the
logging industry in general. Most local histories that describe logging activities provide
some type of overview of its statewide history (Missoula Publishing Company 1890;
Shea 1977; Fredlund 1992; McKay 1994; Miss 1994), though this is often short and of
limited value. Gordon (2014) devotes considerable time to the expansion of the industry
in Montana, but mostly through the example of A.B. Hammond, who, though perhaps the
ultimate archetype of a ruthless lumberman and responsible for some of the most
extensive land frauds perpetrated nationally, can hardly be said to represent the average
timber operator in the state. Surprisingly, a small collection of master’s theses from the
Department of History at the University of Montana, authored by Thomas Kerlee (1962),
Edward Butcher (1967), and Judy Schutza (1975), provides the most comprehensive
overview of the industry overall, from detailed histories of logging in various locations in
western Montana to discussions of timber depredation and fraud in a Montana-specific
setting. Skid Trails: Glory Days of Montana Logging, a book by Tobacco Plains-based
historian Darris Flanagan (2007), also engages with logging topics from across the state,
though it is mostly concerned with the tools and methods of logging itself, albeit in an
historic setting.
Besides this foray into the experience of early twentieth-century timber work,
Flanagan has also written a number of books and pamphlets addressing a wide variety of
topics related to the history of the Tobacco Plains. Several of these, including Adventures
Along the Fort Steele Trail (1996), Fortine, Montana (2013), and Eureka, Montana
(2020), provide some of the best—and on many subjects, the only—information
regarding the intimate details of the past century-plus of settlement in the area. His work
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joins a small, but important, body of published literature: The Story of the Tobacco Plains
Country (1950), edited by Olga Johnson, is perhaps the local history, still in print and
widely available throughout northwestern Montana with its distinctive green cover; Early
Flathead and Tobacco Plains (1977) by Marie C. Shea, just as well-regarded in terms of
content, but quite rare and expensive to acquire; and Pinkham Pioneers (2006), a littleknown volume by Madeline Utter which is primarily focused on the Pinkham Creek
community located in the west-central portion of the study area. Additional materials
tend to be represented by short, mostly unpublished manuscripts that tackle small or
specific topics that are glossed over in the more general local histories. The writings of
the late Jim Calvi, a former Kootenai National Forest (KNF) archaeologist, are extremely
valuable in this regard.
Aside from extensive archaeological writings, Calvi also produced some of the
only historical accounts we have of the local lumber companies themselves, especially
Bonners Ferry Lumber Company (2004a, 2004b) and Dawson Lumber Company (2007),
the predecessor to the J. Neils Lumber Company in Libby, Montana. Paul Neils, the son
of the latter’s founder Julius, wrote a short history of that firm in 1971. Though both
Bonners Ferry and J. Neils had extensive timber holdings in the Tobacco Plains area, the
biggest player in the local field by far was the Eureka Lumber Company; however, aside
from an unpublished study, again by Calvi (2013), on their later railroad logging system,
no comparable works to Calvi or Neils exist for the Eureka Lumber Company. Flanagan
(2020) devotes some time to the company, as does the comprehensive Historic Overview
of the Kootenai National Forest (Miss 1994)—a Forest Service volume that provides
considerable detail for most aspects of northwestern Montana history, including the
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Tobacco Plains in general as well as the Eureka, Bonners Ferry, and J. Neils Lumber
companies—but neither are devoted to the topic.
A handful of primary sources help fill in the gaps, especially in relation to the
company’s early history and its growth as an employer in Eureka. Several copies of the
R.L. Polk & Co. Directory for Flathead and Lincoln Counties (1907, 1909, 1911, 1915),
found at the Eureka Historical Village Museum and online at the Montana Memory
Project, provide the name of the employer for every individual in town, allowing us to
chart the growth of Eureka Lumber Company’s payroll over its first decade of existence.
The Tobacco Plains Journal, the area’s first newspaper, in turn provides a week-by-week
update on the development of the company, as well as the area at-large, allowing for the
construction of a detailed historical narrative found in few other places. As noted above,
this early paper only exists today on microfilm at the Eureka Branch of the Lincoln
County Library; accessing it required several long-distance trips and more than 40 total
hours to view and digitize as much of it as was possible. In the end, six years’ worth was
actually read and analyzed, informing not only the historical background of this study but
also yielding hundreds of land proof notices that could not be found anywhere else.
A final note is made here regarding oral histories. Oral accounts can have extreme
value in a study like this, as they often explore topics and relate experiences that are
missing from any other resource. They can provide insights that shed new light on
historical research, allow for more accurate analyses of existing records, and enhance
archaeological interpretations. Of course, memories falter, and most cannot be taken fully
at face value, but often these personal remembrances are unparalleled in their ability to
offer truly new information. Unfortunately, many oral histories recorded in northwest
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Montana remain stuffed in the back of old filing cabinets or sit untranscribed in boxes of
cassette tapes buried and forgotten in the corner of an office; examples of both emerged
in the process of this research. The majority of them were also taped as late as the 1980s
or 1990s, and thus feature second or third generation settlers who were either unborn or
mere children during the period in question here. Nevertheless, the dozens of tapes and
transcriptions that could be examined during the research process yielded a small handful
that offer up pertinent details; these include interviews with George Neils (1976), Bert
Thomas (1980), Bert Wilke (1983), and Grace Kenelty (1992).

Historical Records
Addressing the degree to which timber fraud may have been committed in the
Tobacco Plains requires a two-part approach, wherein the analysis of (1) historical
records isolates and identifies likely perpetrators and their corresponding land claims, and
(2) archaeological research on the ground confirms or contradicts these conclusions based
upon how well the material evidence conforms to contemporary accounts of how such
fraud was actually conducted. The results of this operation can then be compared to local
tradition to determine whether stories of land fraud represent an accurate account of the
past, or if they are a type of borrowed folklore, drawing from the more well-known
events on the Pacific coast.
Historical records that are pertinent to this issue are widely dispersed in a number
of different sources. Many of the governmental reports listed above, such as those of the
Public Lands Commission (1905), National Conservation Committee (1909), and Bureau
of Corporations (1913, 1914), as well as the books by Ise (1920), Hibbard (1924), and
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Gates (1968), feature extensive tables and figures that provide enormous amounts of data
related to timber fraud. Most of this is drawn from examples in California, Oregon, and
Washington, but is helpful for understanding how best to frame and analyze similar
information from the Plains. Puter and Stevens (1908) and Curry-Roper (1989) give
accounts that, though not necessarily grounded in hard data, illustrate important
relationships between the survey, purchase, patent, and sales dates of public lands that are
also instrumental to understanding local evidence. Acquiring this local data, however, is a
different kind of challenge.
Information regarding Tobacco Plains lands comes from four primary sources:
The Bureau of Land Management’s GLO website, digital copies of original GLO tract
books, digital copies of the Tobacco Plains Journal, and the records of the Lincoln
County Courthouse Clerk and Recorder’s office in Libby, Montana. Beginning with the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) website, the project area was first defined within a
12-township area extending to the south from Eureka, encompassing townships 36
through 33, ranges 26 through 28. Private and public land are intermingled throughout
this area, with the Kootenai National Forest and a handful of State sections making up the
public domain. Since private holdings could not be examined archaeologically, most
records searches in general were restricted to public lands. The GLO website maintains a
database of all land patents issued in the United States; searches within each township
yielded extensive lists of entries complete with the name of the patentee, the date of
patent, and the legal description of each claim. The type of patent issued (i.e., homestead,
timber and stone, etc.) is not mentioned, nor are any records available for locating
canceled or relinquished tracts. Nevertheless, hundreds of patented claims which are now

14

under the administration of the Forest Service are scattered across all twelve townships.
The vast majority of them were, at one time, under the ownership of one of the local
lumber companies.
Determining which of the parcels identified through the GLO website were, in
fact, sold to the lumber company requires deeper digging. Tract books maintained by the
Clerk and Recorder’s office at the Lincoln County Courthouse detail the complete history
of every subdivision of land in the county, from its original disposition to its most recent
conveyance. Poring over these records for each township in the study area revealed the
identity of every claim that entered the hands of a lumber company at any time, with the
accompanying deed books providing the names of the grantors, grantees, consideration
(price), date of sale, and date of filing. An interesting detail in each case was the name of
the individual requesting the filing of the deed; this was often consistent across numerous
sales involving lumber companies, whether they were the grantee or not. No note,
however, was made of the notary responsible for endorsing the deed; several sources
indicate that the notary public was often involved in frauds as well (Puter and Stevens
1908; Ise 1920; Gates 1968), but this detail appeared too late in the research process to
correct this oversight in collecting data from the deed books.
For most researchers in the past, this was the limit of information that was held in
accessible records. In fact, the courthouse was typically the beginning and the end of the
search, being that it also holds copies of local land patents alongside the hundreds of deed
books. Any further refinement of data was practically impossible, and as such other types
of records were usually treated as if they simply did not exist. However, as previously
noted, there were several laws under which a claimant might take land, and the
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requirements under each were drastically different. For timber lands, people were
essentially limited to the Homestead Act or the Timber and Stone Act. Under the
Homestead Act, a claimant had to make the land his or her home and build certain
improvements like a cabin and a fence, as well as place so many acres of land into
cultivation to receive a patent; under the Timber and Stone Act, they simply had to swear
it was more valuable for timber than for farming and pay $2.50 per acre for it. This
distinction between the two is critical in assessing archaeological potential, since one
type of claim would be expected to leave behind numerous identifiable features, while the
other might reasonably leave nothing at all. As later chapters reveal, past researchers’
inability to distinguish between these two due to research limitations has led to
widespread misinterpretations in the existing archaeological record.
Where, then, might such information be found? It would seem reasonable to
expect that these sorts of details should be available on the existing GLO website, but in
fact the BLM has yet to sort through and digitize the thousands of original GLO tract
books in its possession for most of the public land states. These books do contain data
regarding claim type, alongside numerous other typically unavailable pieces of
information, but they only exist physically in two places: In the National Archives, and,
for the State of Montana, at the BLM Field Office in Billings. Perhaps the pre-internet
archaeologists on the KNF could be forgiven for excluding them, since, even if they were
aware of the books’ existence, the 1000-mile round-trip to look at them was almost
certainly beyond their means. However, as revealed through personal communication
with the Billings Office, digital versions of the GLO tract books do exist, and in free and
accessible form, though in a rather unexpected place: an unassuming genealogy website

16

called familysearch.org, operated and maintained by the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints.
This website hosts thousands, if not millions, of historical records from every U.S.
state and from around the world, many of which are probably standardly available on any
genealogy site for a fee. Familysearch.org, however, is offered completely free of cost,
requiring only that a researcher create an account before accessing their services. Among
these records are nearly 1,000,000 scans of GLO tract books covering the entire nation—
digitized, according to personal communication with the BLM, by the Church itself.
These records are organized by township, though in a rather cumbersome way, and it can
take a significant amount of time to sift through them and locate the appropriate book.
Regardless of these difficulties, however, the information contained therein is priceless.
In addition to a note indicating the type of claim next to each entry, the tract books
reveal: all cancellations and relinquishments; for homestead claims, the initial filing, final
certificate, and, if applicable, commutation dates; for timber and stone claims, the date of
actual purchase; and for each township as a whole, the dates regarding when the official
survey was conducted, accepted, and posted at the local land office, at which latter point
the land was open for private entry. They also indicate the dates and extent of any
withdrawals made for forestry purposes. Each and every one of these points of
information is crucial to actually refining the known data down to a usable form, and
eventually unraveling the question of land fraud in the Tobacco Plains.
One final additional layer of detail is found in the early issues of the Tobacco
Plains Journal. Alongside the week-by-week accounts of local, state, and national
happenings contained in its pages, the Journal also features hundreds of published
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notices regarding upcoming land claim proofs, especially between the years of 1903 and
1909. According to most land laws, including the Homestead and the Timber and Stone,
a claimant was required to publish a notice of his or her intent to give final proof in the
weekly newspaper of widest circulation nearest to their claim, for a period of 60 to 90
days; this allowed anyone with adverse cause or a competing claim to file a contest if
they so wished, before the land went to patent. Each notice contained several new pieces
of information, including: the name of the Land Office official or U.S. Commissioner
taking the proofs; the names and locations of each witness named in the application; the
location of the claimant; and, for Timber and Stone claims, the date of actual original
filing. The data regarding witnesses in particular allows for an entirely new avenue of
analysis, as there are many names which appear repeatedly on numerous claims as
witnesses, or small groups of claimants who all serve as witness for each other; both
situations being flagged as signs of fraud by other authors (Puter and Stevens 1908; Ise
1920; Gates 1968).
Altogether, the field of data collected from each of these sources makes possible a
detailed and multivariate examination of the timber fraud issue. The numerous
contemporary reports and historical treatments named above provide enough important
details regarding the known methods of committing fraud to permit a modern researcher
to establish an analytical methodology which can answer questions about the situation in
the Tobacco Plains. Comparisons between final certificate/proof dates and first sales,
groupings of filing dates, large numbers of sales to specific individuals, repetitive use of
witnesses (especially those associated with speculators or lumber companies), and
geographic groupings of claims observed via mapping in ArcGIS software can all
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identify patterns within the historical records that allow us to isolate likely fraudulent
claims. Other aspects of common land fraud stories, like the use of non-locals or
company employees for filing claims, can also be tested using information gleaned from
these sources, such as lists of named locals or known Eureka Lumber Company
employees appearing in the newspaper, the Polk Directory, or the indexes of local
histories like Johnson (1950) and Shea (1977).

Archaeological Methods
The second part of the investigation, the archaeological side of things, is in many
ways the more straight-forward. The historical analysis has highlighted the areas that
appear the most likely to have been taken fraudulently, and reporters like Puter and
Stevens (1908), Halm (1944), Gates (1968), Neils (1976), and the three major
governmental reports have provided consistent descriptions of the sites most likely to be
encountered: small, minimalistic cabins, perhaps without even chinking or daubing, and
with few artifacts beyond those generated during construction or, if necessary, to give the
illusion of occupancy when the risk of being caught was high. It should, therefore, be a
simple matter of surveying the ground in the appropriate areas and comparing what is
found to what could be expected.
A preliminary background check of past research in the project area reveals that a
large volume of such work has already been completed. The bulk of Forest Service
administered lands have been extensively surveyed—in some places several times—and a
number of small cabin sites have already been recorded throughout, all within lands
identified through records research as being pertinent to this study. Most of these sites
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were located and studied in the early 1990s by GCM Services, Inc., an archaeological
consulting firm based in Butte, Montana, and included in The Pinkham Project (Fredlund
1992), their report prepared under contract to the KNF. This unpublished document
represents the vast majority of all research that has been done within the area to date, and
as such forms one of the cornerstones of this thesis; in fact, the high number of sites
contained within which were specifically interpreted as being the likely consequence of
land fraud was a primary inspiration for this project.
Due to time constraints and the extremely large amount of acreage available to
survey—most of which has been previously examined—revisiting and reevaluating the
known sites became the primary strategy for archaeological research. When it was
possible to conduct original reconnaissance survey, this was designed and executed
according to the guidelines established in the KNF Site Inventory Strategy (Timmons
2011), though the total area of covered ground amounted to a virtually negligible amount.
Sites that lie within highly suspicious land claims, or that had been described as likely
fraudulent in the original site forms, received top priority, and these were
rephotographed, remeasured, and rerecorded with new artifacts or features as necessary.
A metal detector—a tool that the original site recorders did not use—made numerous
positive indications around each structure which were marked with pink pin-flags,
mapped, and photographed. In areas that could not be visited during the course of field
work, ArcGIS software provided an easy method of mapping and portraying the scope of
previous archaeological survey that covers the array of land claims identified within this
project. This program allows for certain taphonomic processes to be accounted for as
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well, especially wildfire; fire history layers supplied by the Forest Service give a detailed
account of those areas in which sites have likely been destroyed.
Comparing the collected field data with the interpretations of the original site
recorders—and then with the historical depictions of fraud, the predictions drawn from
the analysis of historical records, and the GIS data relating site locations and the extent of
previous archaeological surveys—ultimately results in compelling conclusions relevant to
the practice of timber fraud in the Tobacco Plains. The following chapters address further
details and preliminary conclusions.
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Chapter 3: A Brief History of the United States Land Laws

The history of United States land law is incredibly complex, involving the
interconnecting influences of politics, capital, geography, climate, and public opinion. A
full presentation on the topic would involve multiple book-length volumes, a treatment
which is simply not appropriate or even possible here. The following is, by necessity,
over-simplified, but provides an adequate overview of the development of federal land
policy to understand the place of fraud and speculation within it. Land fraud itself will be
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, but is mentioned below in places
where its influence is important to comprehend the events and beliefs that drove
legislative decisions.

Land Sales on Credit
According to Nelson (1909), the earliest land law of any particular note dealing
with the general alienation of public land was the Act of May 18, 1796, which allowed
for the survey and sale of lands northwest of the Ohio River and above the mouth of the
Kentucky River. This act marked the beginning of a long trend in government land policy
to treat the public domain primarily as a source of revenue, an attitude that would not see
any real change until the Homestead Act of 1862. The Act of 1796 provided for
purchases of at least 640 acres (one section) at $2 per acre and allowed them to be made
on credit, with half due up front and the full balance one year after application (U.S.
Congress 1796). However, few actual settlers could afford such terms, and most sales
following the act were made from private land companies (Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968).

22

Congress attempted to remedy this situation with the Act of May 10, 1800, reducing the
minimum acreage to 320 acres with one-quarter of the total price down and a four-year
credit period. The Act of March 26, 1804, lowered the acreage even further, to 160 (U.S.
Congress 1800, 1804; Nelson 1909).
The credit system, rather than improving land sales, led to a national debt crisis
within just a few years. Many settlers could not afford to make their yearly payments
even with the amended provisions, and virtually none could compete at public sales with
the speculators who took advantage of the eased terms to acquire as much land as
possible. However, since there was no limit to the number of purchases any one buyer
could make, these land grabbers, who thrived in the early boom years after 1800, also
frequently found themselves overextended in the tumultuous economic climate caused by
the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, the 1807 Embargo Act, and the War of 1812
(Hubbard 1924). Debt to the federal government became a nearly pandemic condition,
and for almost three decades Congress engaged in a nearly continuous cycle of enacting
relief legislation which extended the credit limits for delinquent purchasers (Hubbard
1924; Gates 1968). As early as 1812 the House Committee on Public Lands suggested the
repeal of the credit system and the institution of paid-in-full cash sales at the lower price
of $1.25 per acre, but Congress made no move in this direction until 1820 (Nelson 1909;
Hubbard 1924; Gates 1968).

Cash Sales under the Act of 1820
The Cash Sales Act of April 24, 1820 successfully did away with credit and
established a straight-forward method of selling land in no-less-than 80-acre parcels at a
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minimum price of $1.25 per acre. Officials first presented the lands at public auction, and
then offered any unsold parcels in unlimited quantities at private sale (U.S. Congress
1820). The intentions of Congress were that public sales would drive up the price and
continue to generate income for the Treasury, but in practice associations of speculators
regularly made agreements to keep bidding down, and very often no one bid at all; they
simply bought the desired lands after the auction at the flat rate of $1.25 per acre (Ise
1920; Hubbard 1924; Gates 1968; Yonce 1978; Cox 1985).
Settlers in the American West considered the new law with disdain. Though many
had struggled with debt under the old system, the lower first entry costs had at least
placed land within the grasp of the average American; few now could afford to shell out
$100 for an 80-acre farm and still purchase the necessary resources to improve it (Gates
1968). The lower per-acre price also made competing at auction more difficult than ever,
since it was not difficult for speculators to raise the cost over the head of almost any
honest settler while still acquiring it more cheaply than ever before.

The General Preemption Act
Cash sales became especially problematic in areas where settlement had preceded
the official survey. Though it was illegal, it was not uncommon for the poor or the
adventurous to seek their fortune farther afield than the government would prefer. Even
during the credit era there were calls from the West asking Congress for some form of
preemption legislation which would give them legal right to obtain the lands which they
had already settled (Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968). Now that the Act of 1820 had set off an
unprecedented storm of speculation, the issue became more urgent than ever.
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Special legislation granting preemption rights in specific areas and to certain
groups had been passed on numerous occasions dating back into the late eighteenth
century. The first general preemption law designed to help all settlers, however, did not
arrive until 1830. The Act of May 29, 1830, gave any settler on unreserved lands at that
date the preference right to purchase up to 160 acres at $1.25 per acre as soon as it was
offered at public sale. The law was retroactive in nature, and as such was only enacted for
one year. However, public response and the reality of ongoing settlement practically
forced Congress to pass a new preemption bill every year thereafter until finally, on
September 4, 1841, the General Preemption Act was signed into law (Nelson 1909;
Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968).
The Preemption Act of 1841 was designed to give actual settlers the perpetual
right to preempt along essentially the same lines as the 1830 law, though applicants were
now limited to only surveyed lands (U.S. Congress 1841); it would not be until 1862 that
the act was extended to unsurveyed land as well. A claimant choosing to take unoffered
lands (those which had not yet gone to public sale) was required to file a declaratory
statement of his or her intent to preempt within three months of their initial settlement,
and then “prove up” and pay $1.25 per acre for the parcel at the opening of the public
auction. If the claimant was preempting previously offered lands, they had to file their
declaratory statement within 30 days and make final purchase within 12 months. Unlike
under the cash sale law, individual citizens (or those intending to become citizens) were
allowed only one preemption claim and were barred from making application under the
act if they already owned 320 or more acres of land. Qualified claimants were also
required to live upon the land and build a residence and other improvements, and upon
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submitting proof had to swear that they were seeking to acquire the land for their own
benefit and not for the purposes of speculation or on behalf of any other party (U.S.
Congress 1841). Many of these provisos would remain standard features of U.S. land law
going forward.

The Homestead Act
The settler-focused Act of 1841 was a significant step away from the federal land
policy up to that time, which—as embodied in the Cash Sale Act of 1820—had heavily
favored capitalists and land speculators over average Americans. Yet, by retaining the
$1.25 per acre purchase requirement, the Preemption law was still fundamentally in line
with the traditional notion that the public domain should above all generate revenue for
the government. Certainly, there had been special legislation over the years making land
donations or offering various forms of scrip (essentially the right to enter a predetermined
amount of land to whoever held it) to encourage settlement in particular areas (Nelson
1909; Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968), but there was no general law under which regular
settlers with limited means could gain free lands upon which to make their homes.
The West had been fighting for free homesteads for just as long a time as they had
preemption rights. Though their biggest concern had always been competing with
speculators to even get land, frontier settlers also felt as though they were being cheated
by the government by having to purchase it in the first place, since colonial era settlement
in the older states had largely occurred without cost. “All men have a natural right to a
portion of the soil,” was the common refrain repeated for decades (Hibbard 1924:78), and
westerners could not understand how the value of their labors on the land was worth less
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to the government than the $1.25 per acre they charged for it. Congress, however, was
still controlled by eastern politicians in the early years of the nineteenth century, and they
had no interest in losing the cash flow which they felt was crucial to offsetting the federal
debt (Hibbard 1924).
Still, as early as 1825 the Senate moved to investigate the possibility of general
land donations to citizens, and in 1828 the Committee on Public Lands in the House
issued a report recommending “that small tracts of 80 acres be given to heads of such
families as will cultivate, improve, and reside on the same for five years” (quoted in
Hibbard 1924:351). During the 1830s the movement for free homesteads gained more
intellectual traction, and numerous organizations and political parties emerged that were
dedicated to the cause, such as the National Land Reform Association, the Free Soil
Party, and the Free Soil Democrats (Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968). Horace Greeley, one of
America’s most colorful and prominent reform activists, came out in forceful support of
the movement with the help of his nation-wide media network, and believed not only that
free lands in the West would actually increase revenue to the federal treasury, but that
they were also the key to relieving the growing congestion, unemployment, and low
wages that were plaguing cities in the East (Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968). This “safety
valve” theory became popular in pro-homestead rhetoric and came to dominate the
discourse, alongside appeals to basic philanthropy.
Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, homestead bills were introduced into Congress
with regularity, but none proved successful. Though the political power of the West had
by then grown considerably, the ever-increasing divide between the North and the South
overshadowed the debate over free lands until, like many other issues, it became attached
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to the question of slavery. The South had great difficulty reconciling the notion of free
homesteads with their economy; founded upon the products of wealthy landowners and
large, slave-worked estates, this system, they knew, would map poorly onto a landscape
covered end-to-end with independent farmers on small tracts. Thus, Southerners saw the
attempts at passing a homestead law as another scheme by the North to prevent slavery
from expanding into new states and territories. They also resented the usual provision
made for non-citizens to apply for homesteads, as most feared that a land rush of poor
immigrants from Europe would result in a surge of available cheap labor and further
undermine their most precious institution (Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968). As relationships
deteriorated through the 1850s—and as the newly organized and abolitionist Republican
party took up the cause—Congressional voting on proposed homestead bills became
increasingly partisan and regionally divided, and as such went nowhere; the push for free
land would remain in gridlock until the tensions finally erupted into violence.
With the secession of the South and the start of the Civil War in 1860, the land
reform interests in Congress suddenly found their numbers dramatically increased in
proportion to their opponents. Though the war necessarily took up most of their time and
focus, it did not take long before an acceptable bill passed the House and the Senate, and
on May 20, 1862, President Lincoln signed the Homestead Act into law. Commonly
hailed as the single-most important piece of land legislation ever produced by Congress
(Richards et al. 1905; Nelson 1909; Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924; Cameron 1928; Robbins
1939; Gates 1968), the Homestead Act provided for any head-of-household or citizen
over 21 years of age (or alien who had declared the intention to become a citizen) to file
for up to 160 acres of unappropriated, surveyed land for nothing more than a $10 filing
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fee and two $4 commission payments. As under the Preemption Act, a claimant was
required to live upon the land and make it his or her exclusive home, building a dwelling
and other improvements and placing a certain amount of acreage into cultivation.
However, after five years of continuous occupation a homesteader was eligible to make
final proof on their tract and receive a patent with no further cost or responsibility; the
government even allowed an additional two-year grace period if necessary. If desired,
however, another provision permitted a claimant to commute their homestead to a
preemption claim, paying the minimum $1.25 for the land after at least six months (U.S.
Congress 1862; Gates 1968). This privilege, commonly referred to as the Commutation
Clause, would go down later as one of the most infamous in the history of land law.
The Homestead Act was amended numerous times over the following years.
Congress expanded it to include unsurveyed lands in 1880, and extended the
commutation period from 6 to 14 months through the General Revision Act of 1891
(Richards et al. 1905; Nelson 1909; U.S. Bureau of Corporations 1913; Ise 1920; Hibbard
1924; Cameron 1928; Robbins 1939; Gates 1968). The 1906 Forest Homestead Act, as
discussed below, allowed for entry on certain National Forest lands under special
provisions, slightly different than the Act of 1862 (Hibbard 1924; Kerlee 1962; Gates
1968; Fredlund 1992). In 1909 the Enlarged Homestead Act increased the maximum
acreage available to homesteaders in 9 states, including Montana, to 320 acres, though
only lands which were held to be non-irrigable and without stands of merchantable timber
could be taken (U.S. Congress 1909; Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968). Finally (for the
purposes of this study), 1912 brought two important changes: (1) on June 6th, Congress
reduced the required occupancy time on a claim from 5 to 3 years, with 5 months’
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absence allowed per year; (2) and on August 10th, an amendment attached to the annual
agricultural appropriations bill forced the Secretary of Agriculture to classify and open all
agricultural lands within National Forests to entry under the Forest Homestead Act, rather
than at his discretion. Under the 3-Year law the number of commuted claims plummeted,
since claimants could now acquire a free homestead with only 7 months’ further
cumulative occupation than under the Commutation Clause (Hibbard 1924). The
amended Forest Homestead Act also resulted in dramatic changes, with a huge surge in
claims taxing the already limited resources of the Forest Service for several years
afterward (Kerlee 1962).

The Timber and Stone Act
In the same way that the principal of revenue had guided the land policy of the
early United States, an unwavering dedication to the Jeffersonian agrarian vision of
independent farmers seemed to underly almost every major decision that Congress made
following the Preemption and Homestead Acts. The repeated emphasis on the bona fide
settler, the home maker who was to take up the land in small tracts for his or her own
exclusive use and benefit, was logical in the East, where regular rain and fertile soils
made agriculture relatively easy and sustainable. In the arid lands west of the 100th
meridian and the heavily wooded regions around the Great Lakes and the Pacific
Northwest, however, farming was extremely difficult, if not impossible (Ise 1920; Gates
1968), and in these places industrial economies based around grazing, mining, and
lumbering had emerged (Franzen 2020).
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U.S. land law was a major stumbling block for industry because it made the
legal acquisition of economically viable parcels almost impossible. For lumbermen, the
issue was particularly tricky since there was no special classification for timber land nor
any government provision to sell the timber itself—though, before its repeal in 1889,
some large areas (especially around the Great Lakes) were purchased under the Cash Act
of 1820 (Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924; Butcher 1967; Gates 1968; Yonce 1978). Preemption
and Homestead claims made on forested land were valid so long as the legal requirements
of the acts were met, but sawmills and logging operations were capital intensive and
required ever-greater amounts of quality timber as they grew; the supply of wood
available from such private lands was simply inadequate. Yet, the survival of the logging
industry was paramount to the small communities growing in the hearts of the remote
forest districts of the country. Lumber operators therefore faced two choices: they could
either knowingly misuse the land laws to build up large holdings of their own, or just cut
the timber they wanted—whether it belonged to them or not.
Timber theft from the public domain or the lands of absentee owners—such as the
railroads—had been a time-honored tradition in the United States since colonial times
(Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924; Cameron 1928; Yonce 1978). Government land was held to be
a Commons by many, especially in the West, and its resources were considered freely
available to any that would utilize them (Bunting 1994). According to Gates (1968:451),
“the fact is that western society held federal ownership in little regard; few people
questioned the right of the citizen or the lumberman to take timber from public lands….”
By the time the lumber industry had reached the Pacific coast “…timber trespass was so
common as to be a frontier folkway” (Yonce 1978:6). Though Congress had banned the
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removal of trees from the public domain in 1831 (Ise 1920; Cameron 1928; Yonce 1978),
the appropriations made for enforcing against depredations were nominal at best. Federal
land agents were instructed to prosecute trespassers and seize and sell any recovered
timber; however, no willing witnesses or buyers could be found in lumbering towns
where each citizen was as guilty as the next, and the agents were often forced into the
unofficial policy of collecting stumpage fees for any theft they could prove to at least
recover something for the government (Yonce 1978). Though timber depredations were
in this way often quasi-sanctioned, for decades they remained the most demonized yet
most common way of stealing federal forests (Ise 1920; Cameron 1928; Butcher 1967;
Yonce 1978; Gordon 2014).
There were always lumbermen, however, who desired more security in their
operations, and even though it was more expensive they sought to obtain ownership of
timber lands themselves. Outside of cash sales (when available) and scrip, the only way
to do so for most of the nineteenth century was through the Preemption and Homestead
Acts. The vast majority of the forested area in the country remained unsurveyed at that
time (Ise 1920), and since preemption was the only way for anyone to acquire unsurveyed
land in the mid-1800s, it became a favorite vehicle for timber fraud, leading the “officials
of the General Land Office [to ascribe] more chicanery, more misuse, to the preemption
law than to any other public land laws prior to 1880” (Gates 1968:418). In that same year,
however, the Homestead Act was expanded to include unsurveyed lands, and afterward
the two were used in tandem to acquire massive holdings of timber lands that Gates
(1968:440) calls “almost breathtaking.”
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The widespread theft and fraud that came to characterize the lumber industry
during this time made a deep impression upon both the public and the government.
Eventually, the fears over the rapid pace of deforestation and the damage being done to
watersheds in the West would help spark the conservation movement and lead to the
establishment of the first Forest Reserves; in the mid-1800s, however, such ideas were far
from lawmakers’ minds. Debate centered, instead, around how best to adopt a policy of
selling forested land. As Ise (1920:77) states:

Disposal of timber lands by means of the Homestead and Preemption laws had
always resulted in frauds, and, as protection of the lands had never been seriously
undertaken by the government, and the idea of national forests had been only
vaguely suggested, sale seemed the only policy open to consideration.

Though there had been some half-hearted conservation measure presented by eastern
Congressmen during the 1870s, these rarely got far because “western men were usually
well represented in the Committee on Public Lands, and thus exerted a disproportionate
influence in all land legislation” (Ise 1920). Westerners held the conviction that the forest
resources of the nation were utterly inexhaustible (Cameron 1928; Bunting 1994), and
that, in any case, private ownership would guarantee a greater degree of protection from
fire and depredation than allowing the government to continue holding the timber. Many
in Congress held this same opinion, along with the view that divesting of the land to
private individuals was the only solution for relieving the government of the
responsibility of stopping timber trespass and fraud (Ise 1920; Cameron 1928; Gates
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1968; Yonce 1978). The result of these ideas culminated in the Act of June 3, 1878—
commonly referred to as the Timber and Stone Act. Regarding the law and the events
leading up to it, Ise (1920:58) states that:

Considering public sentiment, and even scientific opinion, as it was in 1878 and
previously, it is not surprising that Congress should have provided for the sale of
timber lands. It seems strange rather that the law should not have been passed
sooner, for the policy of sale had been recommended by almost all writers on the
subject. In 1870, R. W.
Raymond, Commissioner of Mining Statistics, in his complaint regarding timber
depredations, said: "The entire standing army of the United States could not
enforce the regulations. The remedy is to sell the lands." In 1874, the
Commissioner of the Land Office, S. S. Burdett, recommended in his annual
report that the lands should be sold;
and in this recommendation the Secretary of the Interior concurred. The Public
Lands Commission of 1880 favored the sale of timber lands, like Secretary
Delano, on the ground that private ownership would provide the best protection.
Even the committee of the Association for the Advancement of Science appointed
in 1873, reported:
"We do not recommend the undertaking of this industry by the government;"
although they added qualifications that could fairly be interpreted to favor a
system of national forests.
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The Timber and Stone Act as originally passed only applied to the Pacific coast
region, namely the States of California, Nevada, Oregon, and the Territory of
Washington, but was extended to all the public land states in 1892. The act allowed for
any citizen (or alien intending to become a citizen) to file for up to 160 acres of
unappropriated, surveyed land which the applicant vowed was chiefly valuable for the
timber or building stone upon it—and unfit for cultivation or mining precious minerals—
and then purchase the same for $2.50 per acre after advertising the claim in a local
newspaper for at least 60 days. A key proviso, upon which so much future litigation
would hang, read:

[The applicant] does not apply to purchase the same on speculation, but in good
faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use and benefit; and that he has not,
directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way or manner,
with any person or persons whatsoever, by which the title which he might acquire
from the government of the United States should inure, in whole or in part, to the
benefit of any person except himself [emphasis added] (U.S. Congress 1878:89).

The Timber and Stone Act provided an avenue for fraud as early as 1882 (Puter and
Stevens 1908), and prosecutions under the act focused upon the fact that so many claims
had obviously been taken out for speculative purposes. However, in 1892 the Supreme
Court ruled in United States v. Budd that:
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All that it (the statute) denounces is a prior agreement, the acting for another in
the purchase. If when the title passes from the government no one save the
purchaser has any claim upon it, or any contract or agreement for it, the act is
satisfied. [A company or speculator] might rightfully go or send into that vicinity
and make known generally, or to individuals, a willingness to buy timber land at a
price in excess of that which it cost to obtain it from the government; and any
person knowing of that offer might rightfully go to the land office and make
application and purchase the track from the government (quoted in Ricks
1915:18).

This decision would go on to haunt the government. While virtually every ensuing report
concerning the land laws decried the abuses occurring under the Timber and Stone Act
(Hansbrough et al. 1903; Richards et al. 1905; Gannett 1909; U.S. Bureau of
Corporations 1913), they equally lamented the impossibility of actually convicting
anyone due to the extreme difficulty in proving a prior agreement to sell. The Public
Lands Commission of 1903 summed up its opinion by stating:

Many transfers of land patented under this law are made immediately upon
completion of title, often on the same day, to individuals and companies. In this
way a monopoly of the timber supplies of the public-land States is being created
by systematic collusion. Under the existing rules and practices of the courts it is
difficult to prove this collusion, except in cases of open fraud, and it is therefore
practically impossible to secure conviction. Furthermore, under bona fide
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compliance with the actual provisions of the law the effect is almost equally bad.
The law itself is seriously defective [emphasis added] (Richards et al. 1905:XVI).

However, Yonce, in 1978 (17), offered a different take on the Timber and Stone
Act. He held that the law did not cause the vast concentrations of timber ownership it was
accused of, but instead “democratized timberland investment,” and actually resulted in a
system of dispersed small holdings, most of which remained outside the grasp of the
lumber companies. In fact, the two largest timber holdings in Washington, making up
34.6 percent of all private timber in the state, were almost exclusively based upon the
Northern Pacific Railway land grant, the owners being the Weyerhaeuser Timber
Company and the Northern Pacific itself. Though these corporations and many others
supplemented their possessions through the Timber and Stone Act, it was hardly the
foundation of their empires.

The General Revision Act and the Forest Management Act
As the nation had become increasingly aware of the scope of fraudulent activity
on the public domain during the 1870s, Congress finally thought to try to investigate the
problem in a comprehensive way. On March 3, 1879, they established the first Public
Lands Commission (PLC), comprising James A. Williamson, then Commissioner of the
General Land Office (GLO), Clarence King, Head of the Geological Survey, and three
civilians appointed by the President: Alexander T. Britton, Thomas Donaldson, and John
Wesley Powell (Gates 1968). This Commission took up the task of examining and
codifying, for the first time, the almost 3,000 separate pieces of general and special
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legislation passed by Congress since 1796, and making recommendations regarding the
most effective and efficient ways of simplifying and amending these laws for the
betterment of the land system (Donaldson 1880; Robbins 1939; Gates 1968).
The PLC made numerous suggestions, ranging from reorganizing the GLO,
eliminating contract surveying, and increasing classification of mineral and timber lands,
to the repeal of the Preemption Act, the Desert Land Act, and the Timber Culture Act—
the latter two being laws of the 1870s that had already seen extensive misuse in grazing
land fraud and speculation (Gates 1968). After receiving the final report, Congress
virtually ignored its recommendations; though many lawmakers were shocked at the
abuses the study had unearthed, they were simply not ready to undertake the sort of
dramatic, radical changes the Commission was advocating.
Public opinion, however, was also beginning to turn against the nation’s land
laws, particularly as people became more aware of the massive land holdings that were
emerging around them. Even though the average westerner had no compunction about
abusing the laws for his or her own benefit and were usually more than happy to make
some extra cash when approached by others, they resented the large-scale absentee
owners who they began to see as land monopolists, blocking settlement and development
in the same way that the government did (Puter and Stevens 1908; Ise 1920; Cameron
1928; Gates 1968; Gordon 2014). This growing tide of anti-monopoly and anti-corporate
sentiment during the 1880s finally forced Congress to debate and take action, and on
March 3, 1891, they finally passed the first legislation aimed at legitimately reconsidering
the nation’s land laws: The General Revision Act.
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The Act of 1891 took many steps to try to extinguish fraud and protect the public
domain, many of which had first been recommended by the PLC. It officially repealed
the Preemption and Timber Culture Acts, significantly modified the Desert Land Act, and
extended the 6-month commutation period provided under the Homestead Act to 14
months. However, after several sections dealing with other slight modifications of the
existing laws, the public lands in Alaska, and right-of-way provisions for canals on public
lands, the act concluded with an amendment that was largely overlooked at the time it
was passed, but would have perhaps the most significant consequences for the future of
the public domain:

Section 24: That the President of the United States may, from time to time, set
apart and reserve, in any State or Territory having public land bearing forests, in
any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth,
whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations, and the President
shall, by public proclamation, declare the establishment of such reservations and
the limits thereof (U.S. Congress 1891:1103).

Popularly referred to as the Forest Reserve Act, Section 24 of the General
Revision Act was a quiet victory for the growing conservation movement. Interest in the
environmental consequences of deforestation had been brewing for quite some time by
1891, in particular the effects that the loss of trees had upon streams and drainages.
George Perkins Marsh, whose groundbreaking 1864 volume Man and Nature was one of
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the first to treat forests as a delicate ecosystem suffering under the disruptions of human
beings, professed that:

When the forest is gone, the great reservoir of moisture stored up in its vegetable
mould is evaporated, and returns only in deluges of rain to wash away the parched
dust into which that mould has been converted. The well-wooded and humid hills
are turned to ridges of dry rock, which encumbers the low grounds and chokes the
watercourses with its debris, and . . . the whole earth, unless rescued by human art
from the physical degradation to which it tends, becomes an assemblage of bald
mountains, of barren, turf-less hills, and of swampy and malarious plains (Marsh
1864:42).

According to Cox (1985), Marsh’s work was the most important step toward scientific
management and protection of the nation’s forest lands, stating that “Gifford Pinchot was
to label it ‘epoch-making,’ and years later Lewis Mumford would describe it as ‘the
fountain-head of the conservation movement.’” It is little surprise, then, that following its
publication the 1870s saw a massive surge of interest in the field of forestry, with a
multitude of journals and publications appearing on the topic alongside several national
and state organizations such as the American Forestry Association, American Forestry
Congress, Ohio Forestry Association, and Pennsylvania Forestry Association (Ise 1920;
Cox 1985). The government began investigating the possibilities of the field as well, after
the American Association for the Advancement of Science sent a memorial to Congress
in 1873 advising them on the subject (Ise 1920; Pinchot 1937). With this emergence of an
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intellectual movement and the growing public outcry against the widespread
appropriation of timber lands—and occasionally even against their wanton destruction
(Ise 1920; Cox 1985; Bunting 1994)—numerous reports and occasional bills began to
appear in the 1880s urging the creation of forest reserves to save what was left from the
ravages of the lumber industry (Ise 1920; Bunting 1994).
Under the Forest Reserve Act these wishes were answered, and the U.S.
government made the most radical change regarding land policy in its history. Within a
month of its enactment President Harrison established the Yellowstone National Park
Reserve, and by the end of his presidency 14 additional forest reserves dotted the
American West. President Cleveland, in his second term, courted significant controversy
when he established 13 more without warning during his last days in office. However,
neither were to compare to the sheer passion and fervor for conservation that
characterized Theodore Roosevelt, who created 150 reserves encompassing 148,346,925
acres in just 6 years, 32 of which he proclaimed in the two days before Congress took the
power away from him (Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924; Cameron 1928; Gates 1968; Bassman
1974; Miss 1994).
Though the Act of March 3, 1891, gave the President the power to set aside forest
reserves, it provided nothing whatsoever by way of administering them. This lack of
provision in the immediate term resulted in a policy of “locking them up,” since the
government lacked the authority to do anything else with them; they were simply
reserved from use or entry (Ise 1920; Cameron 1928; Kerlee 1962; Bassman 1974). The
West erupted in protest to the forest withdrawals, particularly the 13 made by Cleveland
in early 1897, since it appeared to them that the government was sucking away their very
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lifeblood. Many areas had counted on the resources of their forests for their development,
and consequently felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under their feet. They also
believed that massive acreages of valuable agricultural lands had been mistakenly swept
up in the reservations, further slowing settlement and growth (Ise 1920; Kerlee 1962;
Bassman 1974). As Senator Heyburn of Idaho put it, “It is men we want, not trees”
(Tobacco Plains Journal 1906:4).
After several years of debate, Congress finally put forward a solution on June 4,
1897. Attached as an amendment to the Sundry Civil Appropriations bill, the Forest
Management Act, commonly called the Organic Act, sought to find a compromise
between the interests of the industrial West and conservationist East. The law provided,
for the first time, an apparatus by which the forest reserves could actually be managed,
allowing the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture) to adopt
methods for fire protection and make timber sales of “dead, mature, or large growths of
trees” to promote the health and growth of the forest (Bassman 1974). It also suspended
President Cleveland’s recent reservations until March 1, 1898 (allowing for entry under
the land laws until that date), and provided free timber and stone for settlers living within
the reserves for fuel and building materials.
However, much like the Commutation Clause of the Homestead Act, the Forest
Management Act contained one seemingly defective section which, in this case, would
actually accelerate the destruction of forests outside the reserves through the widespread
frauds it made possible—The Forest Lieu Act (Puter and Stevens 1908; Ise 1920;
Cameron 1928; Appleman 1939; Messing 1966; Gates 1968; Calvi 2004b; Gordon 2014).
According to this provision:
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…in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected bona fide claim or by a
patent is included within the limits of a public forest reservation, the settler or
owner thereof may, if he desires to do so, relinquish the tract to the Government,
and may select in lieu thereof a tract of vacant land open to settlement not
exceeding in area the tract covered by his claim or patent; and no charge shall be
made in such cases for making the entry of record or issuing the patent to cover
the tract selected: Provided further, That in cases of unperfected claims the
requirements of the laws respecting settlement, residence, improvements, and so
forth, are complied with on the new claims, credit being allowed for the time
spent on the relinquished claims (U.S. Congress 1897:36).

While ostensibly made for the benefit of actual settlers who might prefer to take lands
outside a reserve where more established communities exist, the Lieu Act was used
primarily by the land grant railroads—especially the Northern Pacific—and by timber
speculators who frequently used the Homestead and Timber and Stone Acts to take out
large landholdings on low-value lands and then petitioned to have a new forest reserve
created around them (Puter and Stevens 1908; Ise 1920; Cameron 1928; Appleman 1939;
Gates 1968; Calvi 2004b). The abuses under the Forest Lieu Act were so egregious that
the government actually moved rather quickly—in Congressional terms—to repeal the
law, doing so in 1905. In the meantime, however, millions of acres of the best timber left
in the country were taken up, while the lands the government received in exchange were
largely worthless. As Gates (1968:590) summed up the experience, “It is impossible to
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find in Federal legislation a more one-sided and unfair exchange provision which dealt
private interests all the high cards.”

The Forest Homestead Act
The Forest Management Act also allowed for the Secretary of the Interior, when
establishing new forest reserves, to eliminate any agricultural lands that surveyors
identified during their ground examinations, but it did not provide any method of dealing
with such lands if they accidently became included in the forest anyway. Frontier settlers
believed that such agricultural inclusions were rampant, and in most cases actually made
up the bulk of the reserves (Kerlee 1962; Miss 1994). The GLO and the Bureau of
Forestry (the precursor to the Forest Service), though admitting that very small pockets of
arable land were without doubt inadvertently taken up in the reservations, emphatically
denied that such claims were true. In an exchange with Senator Heyburn, one of the
Forest Service’s greatest congressional enemies, Gifford Pinchot asserted that, at least
within the Idaho portion of the Bitterroot Forest Reserve, there were only “…250 acres of
possible agricultural lands, or .03 of one per cent [of the total]” (quoted in Kerlee
1962:34).
Nevertheless, as the West became increasingly land hungry, the government’s
inability to find a way to effectively open the forests for settlement placed the reserves in
almost universal disdain. Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot himself heavily favored opening
the reserves to homesteading under certain conditions, as he believed that settlement was
the best way to improve public opinion and help protect the forests from fire and trespass
(Pinchot 1907; Ise 1920; Pinchot 1937; Kerlee 1962). However, though numerous bills to
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this effect appeared in Congress in the years after 1897, western lawmakers frequently
undermined them with attempts to eliminate or severely reduce the forest reserves
instead, and hardcore conservationists in the East regularly blocked any chances for a
compromise (Kerlee 1962). It would not be until June 11, 1906, that President Roosevelt
was finally able to sign the Forest Homestead Act into law. The Act of June 11, as the
law was popularly known in the Forest Service, provided that:

…the Secretary of Agriculture may, in his discretion, and he is hereby authorized,
upon application or otherwise, to examine and ascertain as to the location and
extent of lands within permanent or temporary forest reserves…which are chiefly
valuable for
agriculture, and which, in his opinion, may be occupied for agricultural purposes
without injury to the forest reserves, and which are not needed for public
purposes, and may list and describe the same.by metes and bounds, or otherwise,
and file the lists and descriptions with the Secretary of the Interior, with the
request that the said lands be opened to entry in accordance with the provisions of
the homestead laws and this Act (U.S. Congress 1906:233).

Entries made under the law were limited to tracts of 160 acres that were no more than one
mile in length; the option to have the land surveyed by metes and bounds was unique in
U.S. land law, but was expedient given the difficult and unusual terrain characteristic of
the mountainous forest reserves. Forest homesteads were also not eligible to be
commuted; this provision went a long way toward preventing fraud under the act, as did
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the Forest Service policy of logging off the timber before officially listing a tract for
entry (Pinchot 1908; Graves 1910; Graves 1911).
Though certain authors have charged that the Forest Homestead Act was another
outlet for fraud (Thompson 1944; Fredlund 1992), most research indicates that it was
very rarely used this way (Pinchot 1908; Graves 1910; Graves 1911; Graves 1913;
Thompson 1944; Thompson 1955; Kerlee 1962; Thompson 1962; Miss 1994); the real
failure of the Act came from the fact that, as the experts had always maintained, there
simply wasn’t much good agricultural land available in the forests (Thompson 1944;
Smith 1950; Kerlee 1962). For the first several years that the Forest Service administered
the law they were deliberately slow and cautious in their approach, as they knew that
releasing subpar lands would do harm to both the settler and the forest. However, the
impatience of the public proved too great a force, and in 1912 Congress passed an
amendment stripping the Secretary of Agriculture of his powers of discretion and forcing
the classification and opening of all lands deemed agricultural in the reserves (Ise 1920;
Kerlee 1962). The result was a massive influx of applications, an extremely overworked
Forest Service, and, after a short period of time, thousands of abandoned claims and
settlers driven out by the isolation, weather, terrain, and poor living conditions
(Thompson 1944; Thompson 1955; Kerlee 1962; Thompson 1962).
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Chapter 4: A Brief History of the Logging Industry and Land Fraud in the Pacific
Northwest, Montana, and the Tobacco Plains

Logging from the East Coast to the West Coast
The first logging in a Euro-American context consisted primarily of settlers
clearing their lands of trees so they could begin farming. In this early colonial period,
newly arrived immigrants typically regarded the woods as a place of darkness and
danger, especially compared to their largely deforested European homelands, and a major
impedance to progress and civilization (Cameron 1928; Cox 1985). They took what
timber they needed for construction and fuel and then burned the rest; trees were regarded
as little more than weeds and a nuisance at that time. The forests in North America were
vast in a way that the colonists had never witnessed before, and they could not imagine
that they would ever want for a supply of wood (Cameron 1928; Cox 1985).
Though the “myth of inexhaustibility” would continue to haunt the relationship
between Americans and their forests for centuries on (Cameron 1928; Cox 1985; Bunting
1994), towns and cities along the East Coast began to experience timber shortages within
just a few decades of settlement (Ise 1920). The resulting rise in demand for trees
coincided with a general push of settlers into the northeastern areas of Maine and New
Hampshire, where immense stands of eastern white pine covered the landscape (Franzen
2020). Since the soil in this region was poorly suited for agriculture, the inhabitants
instead survived by logging along the major waterways in order to meet the timber needs
of the colonies to the south; thus began the initial stage of American commercial logging,
or the first “logging frontier” (Franzen 2020:24). By the time operations shifted from the
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Northeast to the Great Lakes in the mid-1800s, cities such as Bangor, Maine,
Williamsport, Pennsylvania, and Albany, New York, had each, at varying times, claimed
the title of “Lumber Capital of the World” (Franzen 2020:27).
As Franzen (2020) notes, historians have usually divided the logging industry
into four main regions that, for the most part, follow each other chronologically. While a
few operators attempted to utilize lower-value trees or alternative methods of
transportation when the easily accessible stands of preferred timber species began to
disappear, most simply looked for those same trees in new areas. Thus, when the white
pine in the Northeast started to run out in the 1840s and 1850s, lumbermen turned to the
Great Lakes, taking up vast acreages of that region’s white pine through private sale and
with land scrip (Ise 1920; Yonce 1978; Franzen 2020). As these resources too began to
wane at the approach of the 20th century, loggers looked to the South, especially the Gulf
states, where the longleaf, shortleaf, slash, and loblolly pines (collectively marketed as
Southern yellow pine) produced immense quantities of lumber, ship resin, and
turpentine—often, tragically, through the low-paid labor of African Americans who
worked in virtual slavery (Franzen 2020). Lastly, as transcontinental railroads finally
connected the markets of the country to the legendary Douglas fir forests of the Cascade
Range at the end of the 19th century, southern and midwestern lumber barons converged
on the Pacific Northwest in a mad frenzy of scheming and fraudulent timber buying that
kicked off the most prodigious era of logging in the nation’s history (Richards et al. 1905;
Puter and Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909; Bureau of Corporations 1913, 1914; Ise 1920;
Cameron 1928; Pinchot 1937; Appleman 1939; Robbins 1939; Messing 1966; Neils
1971; Yonce 1978; Bunting 1994; Franzen 2020).
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Though lumbering may have reached its commercial zenith in the Northwest, it
was in the Great Lakes region that, according to Cox, the industry attained its “full
flowering” (quoted in Franzen 2020:27). As logging outfits first began to move from the
Northeast to the Lake states, technology remained much as it had for the past two
hundred years: Single-bitted felling axes, crosscut bucking saws, water-based
transportation systems, and animal- and human-muscle power. Though the latter two
factors would remain essential to logging well into the 20th century, innovations in
equipment during the 1870s resulted in massive changes that essentially revolutionized
the field. Double-bitted axes, first developed in the 1850s, had distinct advantages over
their counterparts: they were better balanced, more aerodynamic, and the opposing blades
could be sharpened specifically for different tasks such as felling and swamping
(removing the limbs from the log after it had reached the ground) (Flanagan 2003;
Franzen 2020). They were, however, for various reasons slow to catch on; it took nearly
20 years before they came to generally replace single-bitted axes in most lumber camps.
Around the time this finally happened, though, crosscut felling saws also appeared on the
scene. These were manufactured with special raker teeth that were capable of clearing the
sawdust out of the cut, meaning the saw would no longer bind up if it was used in a
horizontal position. This flaw in traditional crosscuts had always meant that they were
only useful to buck logs (separate them into manageable lengths) while they were on the
ground, where gravity could do the work (Flanagan 2003; Franzen 2020).
The introduction of these two tools meant that loggers could now harvest trees at
a much faster rate than had ever been possible before, and the increased availability of
sawlogs meant that mills had to upgrade to keep up. Sawmill equipment, however, was
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much more expensive to improve and maintain, and required significant amounts of
capital to do so. This expanded capitalization, in turn, required ever greater quantities of
wood to keep the mills afloat (Libecap 2007; Gordon 2014; Yonce 1978; Libecap and
Johnson 1979; Franzen 2020). This created a feedback loop which, in a setting like the
Great Lakes timberlands—with its vast networks of workable waterways and large
numbers of recently arrived Scandinavian immigrants, most of whom had extensive
logging experience—resulted in the emergence of the first truly “industrial-scale” logging
(Franzen 2020). This period in the timber industry set the stage for what was to come; for
the next century, virtually every major lumber company operating in the nation had its
roots in the Midwest logging boom (Puter and Stevens 1908; Bureau of Corporations
1913, 1914; Neils 1971; Neils 1976; Fredlund 1992; Miss 1994; Calvi 2004a; Calvi
2004b; Calvi 2007; Franzen 2020).
The place where the “full flowering” really bore fruit, however, was the
Northwest, where in a perfect storm of climate, geography, technology, and capitalism,
the lumber industry reached heights that had never been dreamed of anywhere on the
planet. The utterly massive Douglas fir, red cedar, and redwood trees of the Pacific Slope
had been the stuff of legend since at least the early 19th century: In 1845, a settler named
James Clyman wrote that the “Firr of this country is beyon all conception there being
Nothing in the states to bear any comparison;” another named Andrew Rogers stated in
1846 that “the timber in the Cascade Mts... appeared to me as though I had never seen
timber before so far did it exceed any that I had ever before seen” (quoted in Bunting
1994:42). Countless other explorers, fur traders, and pioneers made similar reports over
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the years, yet the geographic isolation of the region prohibited the development of
anything approaching large-scale commercial logging for nearly 100 years.
The Hudson’s Bay Company built the first sawmill in the Pacific Northwest at a
point near Fort Vancouver sometime before 1829, when they exported their first
shipment of wood to Hawaii. The mill also sent a small handful of orders to California as
early as 1831 (Bunting 1994), though, with the extremely low population of Europeans in
the West at this time, such transactions were few and far between. The vast majority of
timber was cut for local exchange and consumption until 1850, when the previous year’s
gold rush in California created a soaring market for lumber. The 18 sawmills that dotted
the lower Columbia River in 1848 exploded to over 100 by 1851, and the booming forest
economy drew in capital and people from all across the country (Bunting 1994). From
this early point on, the lumber industry was firmly entrenched as the focal point of the
Northwest’s economy.
As Franzen (2020:34) states, “North America was exceptional in terms of forest
resources and the volume of industrial logging during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and the Pacific Northwest stood out within North America.” Reaching this
exalted position, however, took the combined influence of three important forces that just
happened to come together during the 1880s: (1) The completion of the transcontinental
railroads; (2) The utilization of steam-powered logging equipment; and (3) The arrival of
Midwestern capital. When the Northern Pacific Railroad finished construction in 1883,
the Northwest finally found itself connected to a major artery of the national economy
(Bunting 1994; Franzen 2020). The addition of the Great Northern, the Milwaukee Road,
the Southern Pacific, and numerous others in following years further increased the
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region’s economic reach. Eventually, northwestern timber would not only compete with,
but dominate other markets; by the 1920s, Washington and Oregon produced over half of
the lumber manufactured in the country (Franzen 2020).
Besides their value for shipping and marketing, railroads also became
instrumental to logging itself. The terrain of the Pacific Northwest, particularly in the
Cascade Mountains, is extremely rugged and difficult to traverse. Many of the streams,
including the major waterways, are far too precipitous and hazardous for loggers to
attempt river drives. Logging railroads, often utilizing systems of switchbacks and
extraordinarily steep grades, became an integral part of the northwestern logging strategy,
alongside chutes and flumes which could quickly transport logs to lower elevations—
though woe be to any logger who was standing in the way if one were to fly out
prematurely (Flanagan 2003; Franzen 2020).
Railroads allowed lumber companies to access all but the very steepest stands of
timber, opening the landscape as never before. However, it was another innovation of the
1880s that was to truly revolutionize the industry: the steam donkey. Invented in 1881 by
John Dolbeer, a redwood lumberman in Humboldt County, California (Gordon 2014;
Franzen 2020), the steam donkey was fundamentally just a steam engine attached to a
length of cable. However, this machine—named for one of the beasts it was purported to
replace—could do things far beyond what any animal was capable of. Up until this point,
loggers had relied on horses, mules, donkeys, and even oxen to skid (drag) logs from the
place where they were felled to a yarding area (temporary holding location), and then
again to the streambank, lakeshore, or railroad that would take the timber to the mill
(Bunting 1994; Flanagan 2003; Franzen 2020). This limited not only the geographical
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range they could work within—usually a mile or two to either side of their main
transportation line—but also the season; logging was traditionally winter work, since the
snow and ice made skidding much easier on the animals (Flanagan 2003).
A steam donkey did not have any of these limitations. It could drag logs from as
far away as its cable could reach and worked in any season. When used in conjunction
with a logging railroad, draft animals were sometimes not even needed at all, since a
steam donkey could power a number of different skidding and loading machines. As
George Emerson, a Washington lumberman put it:

When one considers [that steam donkey's [sic]]...require no stable and no feed,
that all expense stops when the whistle blows, no oxen killed and no teams to
winter, no ground too wet, no hill too steep, it is easy to see they are a revolution
in logging (quoted in Bunting 1994).

The initial use of steam donkeys occurred with ground leads, which caused the logs to dig
deep furrows into the earth as they drew closer to the engine. Because of this, smaller and
economically valueless trees were regularly destroyed in the process, resulting in
significant ecological devastation. It also had a tendency to damage the logs; this latter
fact led to a variety of further innovations to make skidding more efficient (Flanagan
2003; Franzen 2020). Most of these, however, came with further environmental costs, as
clearcutting frequently became necessary to allow the machinery more freedom to work.
This was particularly true with high lead skidding, where an apparatus attached to a
central “spar” tree lifted one end of the log off the ground—greatly reducing drag—and
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skyline skidding, where the entire log was rendered airborne (Calvi 1982; Franzen 2020).
The latter method made transportation virtually instantaneous but was extremely
dangerous; large logs flying through the air were essentially huge battering rams.
The end result of combining machines like steam donkeys and complicated
yarding systems with logging railroads, trestles, chutes, and flumes, was an
unprecedented explosion in the scale on which lumbering was even thought to be
possible (Bunting 1994; Franzen 2020). Sawmills necessarily became a part of this
technological revolution as well, installing massive steam boilers to run dynamo
generators which, in turn, powered electric lights and an impressive array of new and
improved sawing equipment (Franzen 2020). In the early days of Northwest lumbering
loggers typically had to avoid the largest trees because the mills simply were not
equipped to handle them (Bunting 1994); with massive band saws, arrays of modern gang
saws, and even circular saws, sawmills at the turn of the century could cut anything they
wanted to.
None of this would have been possible, however, without the swarms of
Midwestern lumbermen who began descending upon the Pacific forests at the end of the
19th century. The technological innovations of the 1870s had allowed these timber
barons to do in decades what had taken the Northeasterners centuries: The white pine of
the Great Lakes—the “clearest and most perfect timber that has ever been harvested in
the United States” (John A. Bardon, quoted in Franzen 2020:21)—had been virtually
eliminated. The lumber industry had become big business in the Midwest, with huge,
vertically integrated companies raking in millions of dollars, and they had cut out the
dense forests of the region with focused purpose and alarming efficiency. Looking for
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new sources of wood, the massive trees of the Pacific slope, constituting “…the greatest
living biomass per unit area found in any of the world’s terrestrial ecosystems” (Franzen
2020:34) and freshly accessibly by railroad, were too great a temptation to ignore. It was
their endless infusions of capital into this new environment—and their mad scramble for
the best timberlands in the country—that fueled the machine age of American logging.

Timber Land Fraud in the Pacific Northwest
At the turn of the 20th century, the towns and villages of the Pacific Northwest
were absolutely overrun with timber speculators looking to slice off a piece of the last
great “virgin” forests on the North American continent. Stephen A. D. Puter, a timber
dealer who later gained fame as the Oregon “Land Fraud King,” described the
atmosphere around Bend, Oregon in 1902:

People came rushing into the Bend country by scores in search of timber claims.
From 100 to 150 came on one train quite frequently. Some of them hailed from
Minnesota, some from Wisconsin or Michigan, while the Dakotas and other
Middle Western states were well represented in the new immigration. They would
get off at Biggs Station and take the Columbia Southern Railway to Shaniko. a
distance of 80 miles, thence by stage or private conveyance to Prineville, 80 miles
further on. and from there to the Bend, an additional 30 miles. Every vehicle or
animal procurable was consequently pressed into service to supply the abnormal
demands, and the hotels in Prineville and Shaniko were overflowing with guests.
All summer long, in fact, the dusty roads between Shaniko and the Bend were
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lined with travelers, and it was soon evident that a large proportion of them were
under contract to convey whatever timber rights they might acquire to syndicates
of Eastern lumbermen. All their expenses had been borne by the various
combinations of this character, and as several syndicates were in the field
simultaneously seeking to secure control of these lands, the rivalry between them
became so intense at times that timber claimants, or "dummies," as they were
more popularly known, commanded a premium, and the rush continued without
interruption far into the winter (Puter and Stevens 1908:83-84).

As Puter further relates in his book Looters of the Public Domain (1908), cowritten with
former government agent Horace Stevens from inside Puter’s prison cell, such a situation
was typical throughout the region.
Timber fraud, though decried by essentially all contemporary commenters on
forest issues (Donaldson 1880; Richards et al.1905; Gannett 1909; Pinchot 1909; Graves
1912; Bureau of Corporations 1913, 1914; Graves 1913, 1914; Pinchot 1937), was in
reality a necessity for the lumber industry—and a direct result of government policy. As
noted previously, aside from direct cash sales under the Act of 1820—of which there
were never many in the far west (Ise 1920; Gates 1968)—the Timber and Stone Act was
the only law under which any person could deliberately purchase timber lands. Its
provisions, however, reflected the agrarian bias that Congress had clung to since the
passage of the Homestead Act: Land was available in no-more-than 160-acre parcels, and
only to bona fide settlers who were taking up the tracts for their own exclusive use and
benefit. For their part, Congress saw the statute as providing a supplementary woodlot to
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homesteaders for fuel and building materials. As most historians have pointed out, this
did nothing to alleviate the theft and fraud which had pushed lawmakers to adopt the
Timber and Stone Act in the first place (Ise 1920; Cameron 1928; Gates 1968; Yonce
1978; Libecap and Johnson 1979; Cox 1985; Libecap 2007). Instead, it left the lumber
industry—vitally important to both regional and national development—in the same
position it had always been: With no legal recourse to acquire an adequate supply of
timber. As Yonce (1978:13) put it, “The framers [of the Timber and Stone Act], one
would think, had never heard of the division of labor or the Industrial Revolution.”

The Preemption Act
The earliest timber frauds, however, revolved around the Preemption Act,
especially after Congress extended its provisions to the unsurveyed public domain in
1862. The majority of the nation’s forests remained unsurveyed until well into the 20th
century, and since most actual settlers abandoned preemption in favor of free homesteads
when these became available, the Preemption Act largely became the vehicle for
lumbermen to illegally take up timber lands. Many would simply make a declaratory
statement for a particular parcel, log off the land, and then abandon it; it was not
uncommon for individuals to file a second or third statement at other land offices, even
though this was not allowed, as there was virtually no way for the officials to check
(Gates 1968).
This method worked well at the small scale, but large land grabs usually required
the use of “dummies,” or entrymen who received a fee from a speculator or lumber
company for the exploitation of their land rights. After they made proof and received
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their final certificate, these false claimants would deed the land over to the purchasing
party—who had, more than likely, fronted the money for the claims in the first place
(Puter and Stevens 1908). Dummies, who were often the employees or associates of the
contracting agents, were the go-to method for fraud under all the land laws. Critics had
noted such abuses under the Preemption Act of 1830, and the 1841 law gained infamy as
early as 1859 when it came out that several speculators had hired dummies rather than
attempt to bid at a public sale in Lecompton, Kansas (Gates 1968). This pattern of
behavior, which only increased in the following decades, led directly to the act’s repeal in
1891.

The Timber and Stone Act
Though there was a slight period of overlap with the earliest land-buying
activities in the Pacific Northwest, preemption never played a major role in timber fraud
there. Instead, it was the Timber and Stone Act, the Commutation Clause of the
Homestead Act, and the Forest Lieu Act that would cement the lumber industry’s
reputation for shameless illegality. According to Puter and Stevens (1908:20):

The Timber and Stone Act of June 3, 1878, was the favorite method of acquiring
title at that time [ca. 1888], as the Forest Reserve Lieu Land Act of June 4, 1897,
(commonly known as the “scripper law,”) had not then gone into effect, and titles
could be rushed through much quicker than by the pre-emption or homestead
laws.
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Most sources agree that Timber and Stone fraud occurred along essentially the same lines
in every case: A speculator or lumber company agent would round up a large group of
people and secure contracts promising anything from $100 down to a free glass of beer
for each to file upon a 160-acre timber claim. Dummy entrymen were frequently gathered
in urban areas from visiting ships, brothels, and transient communities; Minnesota
lumberman C.A. Smith famously shipped trainloads of midwestern schoolteachers to take
up lands in central Oregon. The agents would provide the applicant the money for the
necessary filing and publication fees, and when time came to make proof—an act that
merely consisted of the claimant and three disinterested witnesses (usually supplied from
the other dummies) vowing that the lands in question were more valuable for timber than
agriculture—they would supply the $410 needed to consummate the sale. As soon as this
was accomplished, the agents would take the claimants to a notary and have them issue a
deed to whomever they wished, paying them the agreed upon fee in return (Hansbrough
et al. 1903; Richards et al. 1905; Puter and Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909; Bureau of
Corporations 1913; Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924; Pinchot 1937; Gates 1968; Libecap and
Johnson 1979; Libecap 2007). Very often the agents, to keep their own names out of the
transactions, would have the applicants transfer the deeds to a third party until the patents
arrived; they would also withhold the sales from record for weeks or even months to
confuse the efforts of government investigators (Puter and Stevens 1908). Finally, when
the fraud was deemed successful, the timber agents would sell the tracts to the
contracting lumber company, or, if they had acquired the land for their own purposes,
hold them until they could obtain a satisfactory price.
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It is important to note that at no point in the above process was an entryman
required to build anything; the Timber and Stone Act provided for simple cash sales.
Though some claimants may have opted to erect a small cabin as a precaution if the tract
they hoped to take was on unsurveyed land—they would receive a preference right to file
a homestead claim if there was intense competition for the land once it was finally
surveyed and opened to entry (Graves 1913, 1914)—it was this very lack of material
overhead that made the law so popular among speculators, even though the government
asking price was double that required with the Homestead Act (Libecap and Johnson
1979). Also, in 1892 (the same year that Congress extended the provisions of the Timber
and Stone Act to all the public land states) the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v.
Budd, ruled that “All that it (the statute) denounces is a prior agreement, the acting for
another in the purchase (quoted in Ricks 1915:18).” Though speculation was expressly
forbidden in the language of the Timber and Stone Act, in the eyes of the Court it was
sanctioned just so long as no arrangement had been made previous to any sale. This
restriction was eased even further in 1908, when the Court decided that a prior agreement
was only forbidden before filing; a company was free to buy from whomever they chose
and at any time, even before the claim was officially purchased. They could even pay the
full cost necessary to acquire the land from the government, provided that they did not
assent to do so before it was originally filed for (Puter and Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909;
Ricks 1915). Though Timber and Stone claims had already begun to significantly wane
before the latter case was relevant (Bureau of Corporations 1913), the former virtually
legalized timber speculation and created a serious obstacle to government attempts at
proving misuse.
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Though there were, without doubt, still large-scale, orchestrated frauds
perpetrated under the Timber and Stone Act well into the early 1900s (Puter and Stevens
1908), after United States v. Budd a different system emerged. Interested parties in an
area could simply make it known that they would buy timber claims above the
government rate—which they often did by conspicuously purchasing a few already in
private hands—and local citizens would begin taking them out on their own with the
intent to sell them as soon as possible (Richards et al. 1905; Gannett 1909). This method
was usually much more lucrative for the entrymen than acting as dummies since they
were putting up the full cost and contracting the sale themselves; most saw at least a
doubling of their original investment. As H.H. Schwartz, a contributor to the Report of
the National Conservation Committee (Gannett 1909:388), put it:

With enough entrymen possessed of $500 each, or credit to borrow that amount,
and a prospective buyer at a small advance, the machinery is complete for
transferring title from the Government or general public to the single corporate or
individual investor. The process has been automatic, and in most cases neither
fraud, perjury, or false swearing is needed.

It is ironic that, given the government’s nearly constant attacks upon the law during the
decades it was most relevant (Hansbrough et al. 1903; Richards et al. 1905; Gannett
1909; Bureau of Corporations 1913; Graves 1913, 1914), most lands taken under the
Timber and Stone Act were technically acquired legally. This was generally true even
when it was used in conjunction with the Forest Lieu Act. The law that was responsible
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for the most actual fraud—more than under any other law combined—was, in fact, the
Homestead Act (Richards et al. 1905).

The Homestead Act
The vast majority of fraudulent activity under the Homestead Act before 1897
occurred through the Commutation Clause, wherein individuals trying to obtain valuable
lands would take out claims, make the bare minimum improvements, and then commute
the entry to a cash payment at the earliest possible date. Most largescale frauds in this
vein utilized dummy entryman, and the operation was, in essence, identical to the process
long employed under the Preemption Act (Hansbrough et al. 1903; Richards et al. 1905;
Gannett 1909; Nelson 1909; Bureau of Corporations 1913; Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924;
Gates 1968; Libecap and Johnson 1979). Commutation was possible after six months
under the original 1862 law, but Congress, in an attempt to ameliorate the widespread
abuses that land agents regularly reported, amended this to 14 months with the General
Revision Act of 1891 (U.S. Congress 1891). However, since the first six months on a
claim were considered “constructive”—the time period within which a claimant
established their home on the land—there were really only eight months of actual
occupation necessary to commute an entry to cash; according to one report (Richards et
al. 1905:XVIII), “This time is usually arranged to include the summer, so that the shack
built need not be habitable in severe winter weather, and the residence on the land may
consist merely in a summer outing.” Homestead cabins on commuted claims were
notorious for being blatantly unlivable (Richards et al. 1905; Puter and Stevens 1908;
Gannett 1909; Neils 1976; Fredlund 1992).
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The Public Lands Commission of 1905 found that in timbered regions (northern
Minnesota was the focus of their study) as many as 90 percent of commuted homesteads
had been transferred from the original claimants within three months of final proof—
often to the parties responsible for locating them on the land. The U.S. Commissioners
tasked with taking the proofs were frequently associated with some type of real estate or
land-related company that potentially stood to profit from the claims (Richards et al.
1905). In general, the report stated that:

…under the commutation clause the number of patents furnishes no index to the
number of new homes. To prove this statement it is only necessary to drive
through a country where the commutation clause has been largely applied. Field
after field is passed without a sign of permanent habitation or improvement other
than fences. The homestead shanties of the commuters may be seen in various
degrees of dilapidation, but they show no evidence of genuine occupation. They
have never been in any sense homes (Richards et al. 1905:XVII).

Four years later, in the report of the National Conservation Committee (1909:390), H.H.
Schwartz stated that “It has been my experience and observation in ten years of field
service that the commuted homestead is almost universally an entry initiated with a full
intent never to make the land a home.”
The Commutation Clause was not the only way the Homestead Act found itself
the weapon of fraud, however. When Congress expanded homesteading to unsurveyed
lands in 1880, speculators and lumbermen sent out droves of dummy squatters to take up
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the best timber they could find, building little shacks to hold the land until they could
legally file for it. Once the survey—which was often initiated at the behest of the land
agent who had already located such entrymen upon the tract—was completed, approved,
and published at the local land office, the dummies would rush in and exercise their
preference rights to establish homestead claims (Puter and Stevens 1908; Graves 1913,
1914). The safest route to a patent in this case was through commutation, which is clearly
reflected in the massive surge of commuted claims that began in 1880 (Gates 1968).
However, there were many who sought to forego the additional time, effort, and money
necessary to perfect a commuted homestead by simply declaring that they had already put
in five years’ residence on the land.
Time spent in occupying unsurveyed land still counted toward fulfilling the
requirements of the Homestead Act; it was simply deducted from the total when the claim
became official. Applicants who falsely alleged that they had already completed the full
term when the land opened to entry could save themselves a considerable amount of
trouble, but this sort of fraud was much more difficult to carry out for two main reasons:
(1) The improvements resulting from a genuine five-year habitation were, naturally, far
more extensive than anything the average homesteader could achieve legitimately via
commutation; and (2) local residents were usually extremely familiar with who was
settling in their region and how long they had been there, even in the remotest corners
(Puter and Stevens 1908). Citizens who were opposed to the efforts of land-grabbers
could easily contest such claims since they knew they were not valid. Only the most
experienced and well-connected land agents were successful in acquiring lands this way,
and they needed not only willing entrymen, but also the complicit assistance of Land
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Office officials, attorneys, and politicians (Puter and Stevens 1908). The Forest Lieu Act
of 1897 made these broad networks of deceit well worth the effort.

The Forest Lieu Act
The Forest Lieu Act became one of the most regretted pieces of federal legislation
in American history because of the inclusion of a single word:

…in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected bona fide claim or by a
patent is included within the limits of a public forest reservation, the settler or
owner [emphasis added] thereof may, if he desires to do so, relinquish the tract to
the Government, and may select in lieu thereof a tract of vacant land open to
settlement not exceeding in area the tract covered by his claim or patent… (U.S.
Congress 1897).

There is some debate regarding when the word “owner” first appeared in the bill: Gates
(1968) reports that Senator Pettigrew of South Dakota, the original author of the
legislation, disavowed its inclusion and placed the blame on some of the more prorailroad members of Congress who he suspected were acting on their behalf; Ise (1920),
on the other hand, makes no mention of Pettigrew’s accusations and suggests that
Representative Lacey of Iowa made the changes when the measure first arrived in the
House. Regardless, by extending lieu privileges to any private lands within the boundary
of a forest reserve, Congress made such inholdings extremely valuable, especially if they
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existed in substantial quantities. Though not a true form of land scrip, lieu rights were
commonly referred to as such and were traded and sold in the same way.
The biggest beneficiaries of the law were the land-grant railroads, especially the
Northern Pacific (NPRR). As the owner of a nearly 100-mile-wide swath of oddnumbered sections stretching from the Dakotas to the Pacific Ocean, the NPRR had seen
massive chunks of its territory swallowed up in the reserves, much of it in high-elevation,
mountainous areas that held little intrinsic value (Appleman 1939). As “base” for lieu
selections, however, these “worthless” parcels could be exchanged for some of the most
coveted tracts left in the country. Though the NPRR did not have to resort to actual fraud
to reap enormous profits from this situation, they were not above engaging in other forms
of subterfuge to maximize the returns; this was illustrated most clearly by the creation of
the Mt. Rainier National Park in 1899.
The railroad owned nearly one million acres inside what was then the Mt. Rainier
Forest Reserve, approximately half of the reserve’s total area. While some of this land
was covered in heavy stands of merchantable timber, most of it was barren and rocky and
of little use economically (Appleman 1939). The NPRR desired to exchange it as soon as
possible, but there was little surveyed public domain remaining of any real value; though
the General Land Office would later interpret the Forest Lieu Act as applying to any
unappropriated land, the language of the law itself was ambiguous, and most assumed
early on that it did not pertain to unsurveyed areas (Ise 1920). As such, the Northern
Pacific appeared to be stuck. However, later in 1897, Senator Wilson of Washington
provided them with a loophole: He introduced legislation proposing the creation of a Mt.
Rainier National Park that specifically granted the NPRR the right to relinquish any of its

66

holdings within the park and choose an equal area of surveyed or unsurveyed lands in
any state that its line ran through. Signed into law by President McKinley in 1899, the act
even permitted the company to employ timber cruisers to make its selections, essentially
allowing it to hand-pick the choicest timber lands remaining in the Northwest (Ise 1920;
Appleman 1939). Summarizing the entire episode, Appleman (1939:202) states:

It has been charged that this bit of legislation was framed in the land office of the
Northern Pacific Railroad in St. Paul, Minnesota. That it was high finance in the
best sense of the term to exchange glaciers for timber land worth $200 an acre no
one will deny. Within a few months the effect of the law could be seen by anyone
who examined the filings in the General Land Office. From 1897 to 1900 only
about 71,000 acres had been exchanged under the general Lieu Land Act. In 1900
the total jumped to 523,000 acres. One authority estimated that the Northern
Pacific reaped benefits totaling almost $53,000,000 as a result of the Mt. Rainier
National Park legislation of 1899.

Few speculators or even lumber companies could wield the kind of political influence
that the nation’s largest land-grant railroad had, though one or two came close: It was
said that Frederick Weyerhaeuser, a close friend and neighbor of NPRR president James
J. Hill, had a direct hand in crafting the Mt. Rainier legislation, and purchased some
200,000 acres of the resulting lieu scrip. Weyerhaeuser would later become the single
largest private timber owner in the entire United States, acquiring the vast majority of his
holdings from the Northern Pacific (Bureau of Corporations 1913, 1914; Appleman
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1939). Timber baron A.B. Hammond allegedly had at least two U.S. Senators in his
pocket, one of whom—Fulton of Oregon—was responsible for the bill which stripped
President Roosevelt of his power to create new National Forests in 1907 (Gordon 2014).
Congressmen, however, were simple to buy at the turn of the century, since they
made very little salary and spent most of what they did get on professional expenses
(Gordon 2014); this made them easily obtainable and powerful accomplices in lieu land
fraud. Even small bribes could contribute significantly to their income: Hammond
reportedly paid Senator Fulton $10 for every fraudulent claim he expedited to patent
(Puter and Stevens 1908; Gordon 2014). John H. Mitchell, Oregon’s other Senator, was
similarly engaged with lumberman Charles A. Smith at $25 per patent (Puter and Stevens
1908; Messing 1966). These high-ranking politicians, though aware of their own
complicity in fraud, rarely had knowledge of the actual scheming that took place on the
ground which brought the claims across their desk in the first place. It was timber cruisers
and freelance land agents like Stephen A.D. Puter that took on this burden—investigating
and selecting the land, arranging for the entrymen, paying bribes to land officials,
surveyors, attorneys, and inquisitive citizens, and contracting with lumber companies—
often on their own initiative and with their own money (Puter and Stevens 1908).
Virtually all of the fraud that Puter describes in Looters of the Public Domain
(1908) was committed in connection with the Forest Lieu Act and falls into two main
categories. On the one side were frauds perpetrated outside existing forest reserves:
These could occur on either surveyed or unsurveyed land and usually involved the
Timber and Stone Act or the Homestead Act, respectively. Timber agents would secure
dummies to file claims in high, mountainous, and extremely remote areas chosen not for
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their timber values (usually they had none), but specifically to discourage investigation.
Once they had procured a significant body of prospective lieu “base,” they would file a
petition with the Department of the Interior to have a new forest reserve created around
their holdings. If necessary, the agents would bribe the official sent to inspect the
proposal in order to guarantee its approval. Once the reserve was established, they were
free to sell the scrip to whoever offered the highest price (Puter and Stevens 1908; Gates
1968).
The other method of Forest Lieu Act fraud made use of the largely unsurveyed
status of most forest reserves. Even though they were officially withdrawn from all forms
of private entry, newly surveyed townships in the reserves were still “opened” for the
purpose of allowing settlers who had taken claims before their creation to legally file for
them. Timber agents, who were typically well connected with the local surveyorgeneral’s office (Puter and Stevens 1908), could easily intercept the surveys and, if
necessary, bribe the surveyor to include locations of dummy entrymen on the plat and in
the field notes, giving the impression that there were bona fide settlers who had lived in
the area for several years. Frequently the agents would locate the dummies on the land
and then petition for the survey themselves (Puter and Stevens 1908). Since commutation
was not an option in this situation, most still resorted to acquiring land rights from real
people and building small shacks to, in some measure, satisfy the requirements of the law
and fend off contests. Puter, however, details one situation where he felt the township in
question (located in the Cascade National Forest) was so remote that there was little risk
of getting caught and so decided to use fake names and forego any pretense of making
improvements. Under the circumstances it was necessary for him to bring the local land
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office Register—who happened to be his partner’s mistress—in on the deal to forge the
applications and accept the “proofs.”
In any situation, and despite the precautions taken, this type of fraud had a
tendency to draw attention from the government. Large groups of applicants
simultaneously filing for homesteads in newly opened areas deep in the forest reserves—
all of whom claimed five years’ residence—could not escape the notice of the General
Land Office, and their special agents were a constant nuisance to speculators and timber
dealers. More often than not, the government agents were all too happy to be bought off
as soon as they hit town, a situation which continuously frustrated the GLO as they sent
man after man to investigate what they believed were obvious frauds (Puter and Stevens
1908). Occasionally, however, one would arrive who was genuinely interested in seeing
justice served, which resulted in ever greater expressions of chicanery and artifice just to
ensure that their efforts were thwarted. Puter describes a case wherein he and his coconspirators were forced to bribe a Land Office special agent, a forest supervisor, one
would-be blackmailer, and several local citizens (in exchange for false affidavits related
to their “relationships” with dummy entrymen), arrange two false tours into different
townships, and eventually travel across the country from Oregon to Washington, D.C., to
meet with Land Commissioner Binger Hermann and Senator John H. Mitchell to make
sure the patents to the fraudulent claims were finally issued. Puter personally paid
Senator Mitchell $2000 for his services on this trip.
The Forest Lieu Act brought the practice of timber fraud to its zenith in the
Pacific Northwest precisely because the resulting scrip was usable anywhere; it took the
guesswork and strategy out of trying to block up desired timber lands with entrymen
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when it was more effective to just plaster claims on the most remote and generally
worthless lands that could be found in—or soon to be in—the forest reserves. The lumber
companies barely had to be involved in the process at all; the land business had become
so lucrative in its own right that other people broke the law for them. These good times
would not last forever, however—as the timber frenzy reached its peak and continued to
grow in intensity, the government, under the leadership of the conservationist President
Roosevelt, began stepping up its efforts to put a stop to it. The actions of Puter and his
associates in Oregon had drawn the most attention, and in 1903 he was indicted by a
grand jury for defrauding the federal government. Later dubbed the “Oregon Land Fraud
King,” Puter would turn state’s evidence after his conviction in 1905 when his coconspirators abandoned and distanced themselves from him; his testimony and active
assistance to U.S. Special Prosecutor Francis J. Heney would result in convictions against
his longtime attorney and erstwhile partner Franklin Pierce Mays, U.S. Federal District
Attorney John H. Hall, and U.S. Senator John H. Mitchell, among many others. Former
Land Commissioner Binger Hermann was also indicted, but he was ultimately acquitted
(Puter and Stevens 1908; Messing 1966).
The “Oregon Land Fraud Trials,” as they were popularly known, marked a major
shift in the disposition of the public domain in the United States. On the one hand, the
speculators and lumbermen had succeeded: Aside from those that the government was
able to reserve in the National Forests, virtually all of the available timber lands in the
country had been taken up. 1906 marked the last great hurrah for the Timber and Stone
Act, and after this year the number of applications for timber lands plummeted to almost
negligent numbers, well before its regulations were updated in 1908. The repeal of the
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Forest Lieu Act in 1905 and passage of the Forest Homestead Act in 1906 virtually
eliminated the opportunity for fraud within the National Forests. Even had the Oregon
frauds not come to light, it is likely that the “Era of Magnificent Plundering (Cameron
1924:100)” would have fizzled out in much the same way (Ise 1920). However, the
impact that the trials made on the public consciousness cannot be ignored, especially at a
time when the fledgling Forest Service was just getting its wings under Theodore
Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot. The timber barons could not afford, in the public eye, to
swallow the land in the same was as they had before. As Stevens (Puter and Stevens
1908:12) states:

…the reign of the landgrabber, of the type with uncouth methods…has departed
forever, and as a class that has been considered in these pages, they have made
their last stand of any serious consequence on this continent.

The Lumber Industry in Montana
As the midwestern lumbermen raced to the Pacific for a piece of the legendary
coastal forests in the last decade of the nineteenth century, they largely bypassed the
interior West. The forests of eastern Washington, northern Idaho, and western Montana—
collectively known as the Inland Empire—were composed of dense stands of valuable
western white pine, ponderosa pine, and western larch, yet these could not compare to the
almost supernaturally massive Douglas firs, red cedars, and redwoods of the Cascade
Mountains. While some of the timber giants turned their attention back eastward in the
early years of the 1900s—particularly Frederick Weyerhaeuser, who became heavily
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invested in at least nine different lumber companies operating in the white pine lands of
Idaho, including the Bonners Ferry Lumber Company (Calvi 2004b)—the lumber
industry in the Rocky Mountain region was a primarily homegrown venture until well
into the twentieth century. The Midwesterners who did arrive were those who had missed
out on the “Great Barbecue” on the coast and, rather than trying to squeeze in for their
share of the scraps, saw the opportunity to instead become the big fish in a small pond.
The Jesuit priests at St. Mary’s Mission in the Bitterroot Valley established the
first sawmill in Montana in 1845, with another built at St. Ignatius in 1856 (Butcher
1967; Shea 1977; McKay 1994; Miss 1994). These mills principally served as a means of
providing building lumber for the missions themselves and other early settlers, a purpose
which characterized logging in most areas of Montana until the beginning of the
twentieth century. The first “major” lumbering anywhere in the territory occurred during
the 1860s and 1870s as a result of the mining boom, with the first commercial mill
appearing at Bannack in 1862 (Miss 1994). Miners, given their never-ending demand for
structural timbers, lumber, and fuel, remained the largest consumers of wood in Montana
for decades to come. This early market, however, was strictly local, as there were no
transportation networks to carry logs and finished lumber between the forests, mills, and
mines outside of waterways and rough wagon roads. This situation did not change until
the completion of the Northern Pacific Railroad (NPRR) in 1883, which connected westcentral Montana for the first time to the economic and material resources of the entire
nation (Butcher 1967; Schutza 1975; Shea 1977; Miss 1994; Gordon 2014).
After the mining industry—especially the copper mines in Butte—the Northern
Pacific itself demanded the most forest resources, requiring millions of board feet of
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timber annually for building trestles, bridges, and tunnels, and for maintaining their
massive supplies of railroad ties and firewood (Butcher 1967). A.B. Hammond, a
powerful Missoula mercantile man who had received extensive experience working in
logging camps in his native New Brunswick, saw the enormous opportunities that
supplying the newly arrived railroad could bring to his firm, Eddy, Hammond and Co.,
and endeavored to secure a contract with the NPRR. Despite the fact that they had
virtually nothing to offer at the time, owning no sawmills or forest resources of any kind,
Hammond managed to secure “an exclusive contract to supply all of the railroad’s
construction lumber from Mullan Pass to Thompson Falls, a distance of 175 miles”
(Gordon 2014:80). The deal would alter the course of his life and launch him upon a
career that would eventually make him one of the preeminent lumbermen in the nation
(Gordon 2014).
Hammond wasted little time in taking advantage of the situation. In 1881 he and
his partners, E.L. Bonner and Richard Eddy, alongside NPRR construction
superintendent Washington Dunn and Butte copper magnate Marcus Daly, formed the
Montana Improvement Company to assume the responsibilities of the railroad contract.
Because the Northern Pacific owned millions of acres of timber land along its right-ofway, there was little concern over where the company was to cut; they quickly sent crews
into the woods along the Blackfoot River east of Missoula while preparing a massive
mill-site near its confluence with the Clark Fork River (Butcher 1967; Schutza 1975;
Gordon 2014). Throughout its operational life this mill at Bonner, Montana, remained the
largest in the state. The Montana Improvement Company was later reorganized as the Big
Blackfoot Milling Company—in part to confuse efforts to investigate the large-scale
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timber theft it had committed on government lands—and sold to Daly’s Anaconda
Copper Mining Company (ACM). As an ACM asset Big Blackfoot dominated the lumber
industry in Montana well into twentieth century and accumulated extensive private
timber lands across the western part of the state, many of them purchased from the
Northern Pacific (Butcher 1967; Schutza 1975; Gordon 2014).

Settlement and Lumbering in the Tobacco Plains
Away from the NPRR and the major mining districts, however, industrial
development in western Montana remained slow. In the open, rolling valley adjoining the
Canadian border and east of the Kootenai River known as the Tobacco Plains, European
settlement did not begin until 1881, although fur traders had been wandering through the
area for nearly a century. David Thompson of the Northwest Fur Company is usually
credited as the first white man to see and describe the Plains while passing down the
Kootenai on an exploratory mission in 1808 (Johnson 1950; Shea 1977; Fredlund 1992;
Miss 1994; Flanagan 1996), at the same time giving them their modern name after
observing the Kootenai Indians growing and harvesting tobacco near the banks of the
river. Traders of the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) followed Thompson as early as
1810, and after the two companies merged in 1821 the HBC maintained a trading post in
various locations on the Plains until 1864, when it was moved north to the site of the
Wild Horse Creek gold fields in British Columbia, later Ft. Steele (Johnson 1950; Miss
1994).
The discovery of gold in Canada brought the first substantial influx of Europeans
into the valley, though not in the form of settlement. Wild Horse Creek lay at the northern
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end of an ancient travel corridor which the Kootenai Indians had used for thousands of
years to migrate northward to the headwaters of the Columbia River or south along the
Stillwater River to Flathead Lake and the territory of the Pend d’Oreilles (Miss 1994;
Flanagan 1996). Hopeful prospectors coming from Missoula found this trail the most
effective way to reach the diggings, though it was also extraordinarily difficult and
dangerous; Lt. John Mullen, ordered to survey the route by Governor Isaac Stevens in
1854, reported back, “Truly, I considered this one of the worst roads, if not the worst,
ever travelled by whites or Indians…” (quoted in Flanagan 1996:17). Still, hundreds of
miners and supply trains steadily traversed the arduous path year after year until the gold
began to peter out in 1870 (Shea 1977; Miss 1994; Flanagan 1996). A second rush
occurred in 1884, and in 1888 the boom town at Wild Horse Creek was renamed Ft.
Steele; the time-worn Kootenai track became the “Ft. Steele Trail”, a name that certain
portions still retain. Most of it today lies underneath U.S. Highway 93.

Early Settlement
By the time that the second round of prospectors made their way through,
however, the Tobacco Plains had begun to change. Earlier miners and packers who had
been impressed by the scenery and climate of the valley on their own journey to Wild
Horse Creek had now returned, this time to stay. The first arrivals were John Campbell
and Colin Sinclair in 1881, though these two had first seen the Plains coming from the
north while leading a party of settlers from the Red River Colony near Winnipeg to
Oregon in 1854 (Johnson 1950; Shea 1977). In 1882 they were followed by the
Fergusons, and in 1884 by the Ramsdell brothers; Tom Quirk took up a ranch in 1886,
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and in 1888 Frank Desrosiers, Ovid Peltier, and Elzeor “Ed” Demers drove a herd of
cattle up from Pleasant Valley to set up their own operation at the south end of the Plains.
The latter two men were partners, and in 1903 founded the townsite of Dewey on their
ranch lands; due to confusion with the postal service, it was quickly renamed Eureka
(Johnson 1950; Shea 1977; Miss 1994; Flanagan 2020).
By 1900 numerous other families had arrived in the valley, among them the
Leonards, the Riches, the Therriaults, the Deweys, and the Sheas. To the south of Eureka,
at the Grave Creek crossing of the Ft. Steele Trail, was the village of Marston, where the
Marston brothers established a roadhouse and store in 1890; a short distance to the north,
near Old Tobacco—the first settlement on the Plains—the Mills family started their own
stopping place, Mills’ Springs, in 1896 (Johnson 1950; Shea 1977). Most of these early
pioneers had settled first in the Flathead Valley, at Demersville or Ashley, and their
names still adorn roads, streams, mountains, and landmarks in both areas.

The Coming of the Great Northern
Lumbering at the turn of the century was by default small-scale and domestic, as
the Tobacco Plains was one of the most geographically and transportationally isolated
places in the entire state. The Great Northern Railroad (GNRR) had reached Kalispell in
the nearby Flathead Valley in 1891, but that was 70 miles away at the end of the Ft.
Steele Trail—impassable for nearly half the year and only wide enough for a mule train
to pass (Flanagan 1996). Under such conditions commercial logging was an
impossibility, though this did not stop the local press from declaring a bright future for
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the lumber industry. The inaugural issue of the Tobacco Plains Journal, Eureka’s first
newspaper, expressed that:

One of the greatest natural resources of the section, and one which can scarcely be
overestimated, is the merchantable timber. For miles to the southeast, south and
southwest vast tracts of this land stretch away into the distance. Millions of feet
are directly tributary to Graves Creek [sic], which flows past Dewey [Eureka],
and with the completion of the railroad this industry alone will be of incalculable
benefit to the community. The principal kinds are pine and tamarack, and it will
be many years before it can be worked out even though operations should be
conducted on a large scale (1903a:1).

They followed this up a few issues later by stating:

…It is clear that the timber industry of this section, now on the eve of being
provided with convenient railway facilities, will grow into goodly proportions;
will create a steady payroll; give employment to many people, and be a
considerable factor in promoting the growth of the entire section in the way of
property values and population (1903e:1).

While a handful of small sawmills had attended to local needs since as early as 1889
(Johnson 1950, Miss 1994), the industry, as the newspaper foresaw, would not experience
real growth until the arrival of railway services.

78

The original construction of the Great Northern had bypassed the Tobacco Plains
entirely by mistake. It was well known locally that a line following the Ft. Steele Trail—
up the Stillwater River to the Kootenai River via the Stillwater Divide—offered the
easiest grade for a railroad from the Flathead Valley, but when surveyor Charles F.B.
Haskell set out to locate this route with guides Ed Boyle and Harvey Fitzsimmons (both
Tobacco Plains settlers), they became lost in a blizzard and took a wrong turn up an
unknown tributary. Haskell, unaware of their error and believing that the pass they had
ascended was the Stillwater, decided it was far too steep to work for their purposes. The
party then spent 52 days wandering the wilderness in search of an alternative, which they
eventually found in the form of “Haskell Pass,” 30 miles west of Kalispell (Johnson
1950; Shea 1977; Miss 1994; Flanagan 2021). Recounting the journey to his wife,
Haskell stated, “I will never again, unless it is a case of life and death, take such a trip as
I took to the Kootenai River….We suffered everything but death, and I believe worse
than even that” (quoted in Flanagan 2021:21).
The original mainline, therefore, ran west from the division point at Kalispell to
Little Bitterroot Lake and then north through Haskell Pass, following Wolf Creek and the
Fisher River until finally meeting the Kootenai at Jennings; the Plains would not gain its
first connection to this major national artery for another decade. This finally occurred
when GNRR President James J. Hill’s investment in British Columbia coal fields caused
the railroad to extend a spur line north along the Kootenai River to Fernie in 1901
(Johnson 1950; Miss 1994). No sooner had this been completed when the Great Northern
reported that, having discovered the lost Stillwater Divide, it would reroute its mainline

79

through Columbia Falls and the new town of Whitefish to connect with the new Fernie
branch, passing right through the heart of the Tobacco Plains.
The announcement of the Columbia Falls Cut-Off, as it was called, set off an
explosion of activity in the area as population surged and several new towns suddenly
sprang to life. Gateway and Rexford came first, both emerging with the Fernie line in
1901. Gateway was located at the Canadian border crossing and later served as the U.S.
Customs House, while Rexford popped up at the point where residents expected the new
mainline would arrive; after discovering they were off by a mile, they simply picked up
their buildings and moved them to the correct site (Johnson 1950; Miss 1994). The
village of Hayden appeared to the northeast of Rexford when construction on the Cut-Off
finally commenced in 1903, and Demers and Peltier established Dewey (later Eureka) on
their ranch at this same time, taking advantage of its centralized location on the Plains
(Johnson 1950; Shea 1977; Miss 1994; Flanagan 2020). To the south, the town of
Harrisburg materialized near the east bank of Fortine Creek, and a camp popularly known
as Fortine’s grew up close by on Octave Fortin’s homestead. However, in a confusing
turn of events the Great Northern, upon completing construction, renamed these latter
two: The depot at Harrisburg (which, being a quarter-mile away from the finished line,
had relocated to the opposite side of the creek) they called “Fortine,” while the stop at
Fortine’s became “Trego,” after GNRR Chief Engineer A.H. Hogeland’s wife (Miss
1994; Flanagan 2013). These settlements and their new names persist to today, as does
Eureka, though Gateway and Hayden were both abandoned—Gateway met its demise
after the customs office moved to Roosville in 1933, followed shortly by the
discontinuation of the Fernie line in 1936, while Hayden disappeared as soon as the Cut-
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Off was finished in 1904 (Johnson 1950; Miss 1994). Rexford survived and even thrived,
but when work on Libby Dam began in the 1960s the residents were forced to relocate
their town for the third time, and today the remains of Old Rexford and Gateway lie
beneath the waves of Lake Koocanusa (Johnson 1950; Shea 1977; Miss 1994).

The Lumber Industry on the Tobacco Plains
The fortunes of the towns and villages may have waxed and waned, but the future
of the lumber industry appeared nothing but spectacular with the arrival of the Great
Northern. The Tobacco Plains Journal celebrated the resources of the area and noted the
activities of timber cruisers and Midwestern lumbermen lurking around the local forests
week-in and week-out (1903a, 1903d, 1903e, 1903f, 1904a, 1904b, 1904c, 1904d, 1904k,
1904m, 1904n, 1905g, 1906s); it felt confident in stating “It is a reasonable proposition to
entertain that the Plains will have a half-dozen sawmills in operation within a year from
date” (Tobacco Plains Journal 1903d:1). One of the earliest major commercial operations
had begun near Rexford in 1901, when Charles E. Palmer established a sawmill on the
Tobacco River to cut timbers for railroad tunnels. James McGovern built one on Fortine
Creek near Harrisburg (Tobacco Plains Journal 1903c) in late 1903, and Eralsey Costich
set up the first mill in the vicinity of Eureka a few months later (Tobacco Plains Journal
1903d). McGovern’s mill was quickly sold to S.J. Dahlberg (Tobacco Plains Journal
1905j), a prominent railroad contractor and landowner in the Marston area, who in turn
passed it along to Havre capitalist Joseph Gussenhoven in 1906 (Tobacco Plains Journal
1906t). When combined with a couple of the older mills that were still serving the area,
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the Journal (1904n:1) could proudly boast at the end of 1904 that “There are now
five…sawmill plants in the plains.”
Though each of these small operations were important to the development of
logging in the Tobacco Plains, none of them made an especially large long-term impact.
A few sawmills set up during the following decade, such as the Lincoln Logging
Company or the Dahlberg Mill at Barnaby Lake, were major employers for a time—
especially for the community of Fortine—but were not big enough to earn the epithet
“The Mill.” That distinction belonged to only one company: The Eureka Lumber
Company (ELC) (Shea 1977). The Journal (1905i) first announced the arrival of E.W.
Bader, then of the Kalispell Lumber Company, in April of 1905, stating that he was in
town for the express purpose of establishing a major sawmill. Bader had recently
purchased the ranch of Mrs. Etta Van Wagenen, situated along the Tobacco River three
miles above Eureka, as a potential mill site, but quickly decided that a location in Eureka
itself with immediate railroad access was a better option. He and his partner, a
Wisconsinite name S.G. Bottum, began constructing the mill at the south end of Dewey
Avenue in May, and by August of 1905 the Bader Lumber Company was up and running
with a half-million board feet of lumber ready to cut (Tobacco Plains Journal 1905j,
1905m).
Bader and Bottum were preparing for a long-term investment. Though they were
forced to contract their early logging, often purchasing logs from local homesteaders who
were clearing off their land, they also began buying up as much land as they could. By
February of 1906 the partners had several million feet of timber standing by, but with all
the expansion they needed additional capital. C.B. Flinn, another Wisconsin lumberman
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acquainted with S.G. Bottum, came into the fold, and the Bader Lumber Company was
reorganized into the Eureka Lumber Company (Tobacco Plains Journal 1906t; Johnson
1950; Shea 1977; Miss 1994). Change and growth were constants for ELC: Machinery
was frequently updated to increase output, splash dams on Fortine Creek and the Tobacco
River were continuously maintained and improved, and more and more land was
purchased to ensure a permanent supply of raw materials (Tobacco Plains Journal
1906v).
One year after reincorporating, E.W. Bader sold his interests in ELC to the
Imperial Elevator Company of Minneapolis, a grain milling outfit that had recently
become invested in nearly 100 lumber yards along the GNRR right-of-way between
Minnesota and Montana (Tobacco Plains Journal 1907b, 1907e; Johnson 1950; Shea
1977). In the ensuing shake-up S.G. Bottum was named company president, while
Charles A. Weil, then superintendent of Imperial’s lumber operations, became vice
president. The exchange brought Eureka Lumber Company a significant surge of new
capital and numerous guaranteed markets for their products, all of which fueled the
ongoing cycle of expansion. At the beginning of 1907, the company owned almost
150,000,000 feet of standing timber and boasted a mill output of 50,000 feet per day
(Tobacco Plains Journal 1906h, 1906p, 1906w); one year later these numbers had
increased to 200,000,000 and 120,000, respectively (Tobacco Plains Journal 1908a,
1908e).
As 1908 dawned S.G. Bottum too sold off his shares, and Imperial took over
completely. Charles A. Weil assumed the presidency, a position he would retain until
1920, and Eureka Lumber Company began charting a course of steady growth throughout
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the next decade. Seven logging camps housing 300 workers grew to 20 camps and 500
employees by 1916, while the mill—running shifts around the clock and powered by both
steam and its own electricity—had by this time increased its daily capacity to 300,000
feet of lumber (Fredlund 1992; Miss 1994). Annual production for ELC peaked at 60
million board feet in 1917, though perhaps not coincidentally this year also saw a major
International Workers of the World (IWW)-backed strike shut down the mill and the
annual river drive. Demanding better hours, wages, and camp conditions, the campaign in
Eureka was intended as a practice run for a region-wide lumber industry strike that took
place later in 1917. However, due in large part to the U.S. entry into World War I and the
perceived anti-American sentiments of the IWW, these efforts fizzled out and did not
immediately accomplish many of their goals, though in Eureka some improvements were
made (Johnson 1950; Shea 1977; Fredlund 1992; Miss 1994; Aarstad 2000).
Eureka Lumber Company made two major purchases in 1918 that fundamentally
changed its trajectory: it acquired the logging railroad and equipment left over from the
recently defunct Lincoln Logging Company in Fortine, and 6,000 acres of prime
timberlands in the same area from the J. Neils Lumber Company (Shea 1977; Fredlund
1992; Miss 1994). Realizing the benefits of railroad logging over river drives, especially
since most of the accessible timber along the waterways had been exhausted, the
company in 1919 began planning a new rail line that would extend directly from the mill
into its untouched holdings to the south (Fredlund 1992; Calvi 2013). In 1920, however,
the Eureka Lumber Company experienced another change in management when P.L.
Howe, a long-time director of ELC and an original incorporator of the Imperial Elevator
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Company, acquired a controlling stake in the company and reorganized it as P.L. Howe
Lumber Mills (Shea 1977; Fredlund 1992; Miss 1994).
Howe believed firmly in the superiority of the railroad and began pushing the line
out immediately, hoping that once it was completed he could phase out river logging
entirely (Fredlund 1992; Calvi 2013). Although the last river drive did take place under
his tenure, in 1922, Howe only succeeded in building just over five miles of his proposed
22-mile main line, terminating it at the head of Frank Lake (Calvi 2013). Shortly
thereafter he sold out to the Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Company of Minnesota, who
continued railroad logging for the next two years. In 1924, after enduring another major
labor strike followed by a fire that destroyed the planing mill, Brooks-Scanlon decided to
pull up the rails and close the operations in Eureka, moving everything to Bend, Oregon
(Johnson 1950; Shea 1977; Fredlund 1992; Miss 1994). With the loss of “The Mill”
Eureka was devastated: I.V. Anderson of the Forest Service stated in 1935 that “The
depression started for Eureka in the year of 1925…Before the nation-wide crash of 1929,
Eureka was reduced to a ghost of its former self” (quoted in Fredlund 1992:29).
While Eureka Lumber Company and its successors were by far the largest timber
owners in the Tobacco Plains, there were a handful of others who had significant
holdings as well. Some of them, like S.J. Dahlberg and C.B. Roberts (of Lincoln Logging
Company), maintained their lands after they logged them or sold them off to other
individuals, causing these tracts today to remain in private hands. Corporations like ELC,
however, often let their cutover lands become tax delinquent, allowing the county to take
them over, or waited for an opportunity to trade them off for something better. Congress
provided just such an occasion in 1922 with a law popularly known as the General
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Exchange Act. Like the Forest Lieu Act 25 years earlier, this law was intended to
consolidate public lands within the boundaries of a National Forest. However, the lessons
from that earlier experience were, for once, not forgotten, and the new act provided for
exchanges of equal value instead of equal area. Selectable lands were also limited to only
those inside other forest reserves, or, after 1929, within six miles of them (U.S. Congress
1922, 1929). In practice, the General Exchange Act became a way for lumber companies
to dump off their unwanted lands to the government; Brooks-Scanlon’s holdings became
part of the Kootenai National Forest (KNF) in 1933.
The only other large timber enterprises to own lands in the Tobacco Plains were
the J. Neils Lumber Company and the Bonners Ferry Lumber Company (BFLC), and
between the two only BFLC made use of the General Exchange Act, trading in their lands
to the KNF in 1934. Founded in 1903, BFLC, a Weyerhaeuser concern, logged along
both banks of the Kootenai River and up into Canada, conducting annual river drives
down to Bonners Ferry as late as 1926; the popular Camp 32 Campground near Lake
Koocanusa sits on the remains of one of its last logging endeavors in the state (Miss
1994; Calvi 2004a). J. Neils Lumber Company, for its part, never logged any of the lands
they held in the Fortine area; company founder Julius Neils had started purchasing timber
lands wherever he could along the Great Northern in northwestern Montana in 1906,
anticipating a move to the region after his operations in Cass Lake, Minnesota, began to
decline. He ultimately chose the town of Libby as the location for a mill and purchased
the assets of the Dawson Lumber Company in 1911 (Miss 1994; Calvi 2007),
reorganizing it as the Libby Lumber Company. After a brief exit during WWI, Neils
reacquired Libby Lumber in 1919 and rechristened it J. Neils Lumber Company.
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Functioning almost exclusively as a railroad venture before becoming a pioneer in truck
logging, the company served as a cornerstone of the Libby community. The only major
lumber concern in Lincoln County to survive the Great Depression, J. Neils Lumber
Company continued logging in the area until 1957, when it merged with the St. Regis
Paper Company (Miss 1994).
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Chapter 5: A Historical and Archaeological Analysis of Timber Fraud in the Tobacco
Plains, Montana

The Study Area (Figure 1)
The major share of large-scale commercial logging that took place in the Tobacco
Plains occurred within a 432-square mile block south of Eureka that includes Townships
(T) 33, 34, 35, and 36 North (N), and Ranges (R) 26, 27, and 28 West (W). Because local
lumber companies at the turn of the twentieth century still relied on water transportation
to bring their annual cut into the mill, their operations were geographically tied to the
major drivable streams such as the Kootenai River, the Tobacco River, and Fortine
Creek. Local settlement also gravitated toward these waterways, and as a result early land
claims were almost exclusively located alongside them in an L-shaped strip of townships
in the northern and eastern portions of this area. Though the interior—comprising T 33,
34, and 35 N, and R 27 and 28 W—is densely forested, it is far more rugged and
inaccessible; even government surveys did not take place until the 1910s. By the time the
Eureka Lumber Company (ELC) began pushing their logging railroad south in 1919,
these lands had long been withdrawn into the Kootenai National Forest (KNF). Aside
from a few Forest Homesteads in the northern part of T35N R27W, no lumber company
land purchases ever occurred in this west-central zone.

Evidence for Land Fraud in Historical Records
Many of the contemporary reports and subsequent studies regarding timber fraud
provide important clues for identifying such activity in the current historical record. Most
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Figure 1 – The Study Area
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sources agree that fraudulent claims were rapidly turned over to the purchasing party,
often on the day of final proof, and that non-locals or lumber company employees usually
acted as dummy entrymen (Hansbrough et al. 1903; Richards et al. 1905; Puter and
Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909; Nelson 1909; Ise 1920; Hibbard 1924; Gates 1968; Neils
1976; Yonce 1978; Libecap and Johnson 1979; Thomas 1980; Curry-Roper 1989;
Fredlund 1992; McKay 1994; Miss 1994; Flanagan 2003; Calvi 2004a; Libecap 2007;
Gordon 2014; Franzen 2020). The Public Lands Commission (Richards et al. 1905), in
discussing commuted homesteads, stated that these would be commuted in the shortest
time possible (72), transferred to the speculator or lumber company—who typically
received title through the second or third purchase—within three months of final
certificate (67-68), and that sales would be withheld from record until the original
claimant received their patent (68). They also suggest that in areas where frauds were
rampant the U.S. Commissioners were almost always involved in local real estate and
loan companies, a situation which was certainly true in the Tobacco Plains: Both the
Eureka Commissioner, H.G. Pomeroy, and the Register at the Kalispell Land Office,
Andrew W. Swaney, ran real estate agencies (Tobacco Plains Journal 1905k, 1907f), and
Pomeroy regularly advertised money lending services (Tobacco Plains Journal 1908f).
Contiguity was also extremely important, as large tracts of land could be more
economically logged and had a higher timber value for speculative purposes (Puter and
Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909; Libecap and Johnson 1979; Curry-Roper 1989). Obtaining
large blocks in single bodies was a time-sensitive pursuit, since the longer a township
was open to entry, the greater the likelihood that the best lands had already been taken. In
areas where timber lands were at a premium, this led to massive rushes on local land
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offices when a new plat was accepted and posted; in her study of the Timber and Stone
Act in northern Minnesota, Curry-Roper (1989:72) observed that the largest number of
claims were always filed in the year the township was opened, and frequently on the very
first day. She also notes that groups of outsiders, often travelling from single locations,
were responsible for most of the large, contiguous tracts located in her study (73).
Ise (1920:74) notes that certain individuals often served as witnesses on numerous
claims to simplify the process of making proof, a problem that Puter and Stevens
(1908:50) dealt with by simply having each dummy act as witness for the other. Puter
(1908:72) also declares that he regularly withheld sales of fraudulent claims from record
for a period of weeks to a few months but, unlike what is claimed by the Public Lands
Commission (PLC), suggests that he only ever kept back the final transfer to the lumber
company before the patents arrived. This final transfer, according to Libecap and Johnson
(1979:135), typically and consistently brought locators and speculators like Puter an
average $6.00 per acre through the early twentieth century. In their own study of the
Timber and Stone Act in the Pacific Northwest, the PLC (Richards et al. 1905:63-65)
held that such sales to lumber companies occurred in at least 50% of all claims, while
Schwartz (Gannett 1909:387) insisted that a full 10,000,000 of the 12,000,000 acres
conveyed under the law, or 83%, were disposed of in this manner.
From the above, a number of clear metrics emerge which serve to evaluate and
analyze the data that is present in the Tobacco Plains: Firstly, (1) claimants should have
sold their land very quickly, from as early as the day of final proof and certificate to
within three months; for the purposes of this study, a period of six months is used. (2)
Local lumber company employees or complete outsiders should figure prominently as
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entrymen, and (3) the entrymen themselves would likely appear as witnesses for each
other. Certain individuals should also appear consistently as witnesses on claims that are
sold to specific companies or speculators. (4) Landholdings should occur in contiguous
blocks rather than scattered, and (5) any homesteaders will have commuted homesteads
within the shortest time possible. Virtually no source on land fraud indicates that noncommuted homesteads, requiring a full five-years’ occupation, cultivation, and
improvements, were ever taken with the intent to sell upon final proof, and this study
will, as a rule, treat them as legitimate. (6) Land rushes should have taken place when the
Land Office opened a new township to entry, with large numbers of claims appearing in
the tract books almost immediately. (7) The percentage of claimants selling their lands to
a lumber company should be at least above 50%, and (8) the average price-per-acre
earned from these sales should be no more than $6.00. Finally, (9) purchases of
fraudulent claims would not appear on record for a few weeks up to a few months after
the transaction is completed—possibly not until after the patent is issued—with the
lumber company being the second or third owner.

Land Sold Within 6 Months
Altogether, local lumber companies—including ELC, Bonners Ferry Lumber
Company (BFLC), and J. Neils Lumber Company (JNLC)—purchased a total of 216 land
claims within the study area; most of these were exchanged to the Forest Service in the
early 1930s, though ELC sold 40 of theirs back into private hands—usually reserving the
right to continue cutting the timber when doing so. Of these 216, 141 were Timber and
Stone and 69 were Homestead claims, 32 of the latter being commuted to cash purchases.
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The Northern Pacific and Santa Fe Pacific railroads each took a small, 40-acre parcel
under the Forest Lieu Act, and the State of Montana sold Section 36 in T34N R26W to
four applicants in 1906 (Figure 2).
In order to simplify the temporal data associated with 216 land claims, this study
has adopted a method of measuring time between two points (such as between the final
certificate and the first sale, the first sale to the lumber company sale, etc.) that is as
follows: 1 Day, 1 Day to 1 Week, 1 Week to 2 Weeks, 2 Weeks to 1 Month, 1 Month to 2
Months, 2 Months to 6 Months, 6 Months to 1 Year, 1 Year to 2 Years, 2 Years to 5
Years, 5 Years to 10 Years, and More Than 10 Years. This scale allows for more
controlled analysis in the short term while more easily managing data associated with
longer time spans where the likelihood of fraud dissipates.
To determine the number of land claims that were sold quickly upon completing
proof, it is important to look at the length of time between the issuance of final certificate
and the date of the first sale. According to the system devised above, these transfers fall
accordingly as (Figure 3):

1 Day:

4 Claims

1 Day to 1 Week:

4 Claims

1 Week to 2 Weeks:

8 Claims

2 Weeks to 1 Month:

7 Claims

1 Month to 2 Months:

14 Claims

2 Months to 6 Months:

29 Claims

6 Months to 1 Year:

24 Claims
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Figure 2 – Lumber Company Holdings by Claim Type
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1 Year to 2 Years:

17 Claims

2 Years to 5 Years:

48 Claims

5 Years to 10 Years:

30 Claims

More Than 10 Years:

30 Claims

Unknown:

1 Claim

Only 66 claims (31%) were sold within six months of final certificate, of which 44 were
Timber and Stone claims, 7 were Commuted Homesteads, 9 were Non-Commuted
Homesteads, 4 were State Lands, and 1 was a Forest Lieu claim. By comparison, 108
entries—a full 50%—stayed with the original claimant for more than two years.
Twenty-three purchasers were responsible for obtaining these 66 claims,
illustrating an immediate and dramatic concentration of ownership (Figure 4; Figure 5;
Figure 6). Twenty-five of the parcels went to 23 different owners, but the remaining 41
fell into the hands of just 7. The largest of these was the Eureka Lumber Company, who
picked up 16 tracts. A women named Dollie M. Bush bought 9, all of which were quickly
sold again to Julius Neils, who himself purchased 3 directly; though Neils made his land
acquisitions in the study area under his own name, they were all shortly transferred to the
J. Neils Lumber Company. Frans O. Anderson procured 5 claims, while the Brown
family and the Huebschman family each nabbed 4. These latter two parties, though
composed of numerous individuals, typically appear in the historical records to have
acted in concert as claimants, buyers, and sellers, and so they are each treated as single
entities. The Browns—in terms of land dealings—consisted of William F. Brown, Mary
L. Brown, Waverly L. Brown, Winne F. Brown, and in-laws Martha E. Brown (nee
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Figure 3 – Period Between Final Certificate and First Sale

Figure 4 – Number of Claims Sold Within Six Months of Final Certificate by
Purchaser
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Figure 5 – All Claims Sold Within Six Months By Purchaser; Small Purchasers
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Figure 6 – All Claims Sold Within Six Months by Purchaser; Large Purchasers
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Costich), Peter A. Costich, Orrin E. Rhodes, and Ray C. Frost. The Huebschmans
included Conrad Huebschman, Marie Huebschman, Louisa Huebschman, C. Frank
Huebschman, and John Huebschman.

Use of Outsiders and Employees
In order to test the Tobacco Plains data against the widespread assertion that
perpetrators of land fraud normally utilized a combination of complete outsiders or
trusted insiders (such as employees) to file claims for them, numerous local histories and
other primary sources such as the Tobacco Plains Journal and the R.L. Polk & Co.
Directory were scoured to develop extensive lists of known local residents from the
Plains, southern British Columbia, and the Flathead Valley, as well as employees of ELC
and some known associates of BFLC and JNLC. These lists are certainly not conclusive,
as it must be assumed that many of the people associated with both the region and the
lumber industry simply escaped the notice of the local writers; this is well illustrated by
the frequency of unique last names which match entries in the dataset while first names
do not. However, only complete matches are tallied, and the numbers of these still appear
significant enough to warrant drawing conclusions upon them. Six main sources offer
points of comparison with the data in this study: the Tobacco Plains Journal (all issues
from 1903-1909), the R.L. Polk & Co. Directory (from 1907, 1909, 1911, and 1915),
Pinkham Pioneers by Madeline Utter (2006), The Pioneers by Samuel E. Johns (1943),
The Story of the Tobacco Plains Country by Olga Johnson (1950), and Early Flathead
and Tobacco Plains by Marie C. Shea (1978). The Journal and the Polk Directory in
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particular offer detailed information regarding lumber company employment, primarily
ELC.
Of 216 total claimants, 143 (66%) occur in at least one of the historical sources;
out of these, 81 (38%) show up in two or more. Thirty-one of the remaining 72, or 14%
of the total, are named as either witnesses or the filer of a sale deed for one of the other
claimants. Only 41 (19%) do not appear in any context. Concerning witnesses, there is a
certain gap in the available historical record: the only place where data on the names and
locations of witnesses appear is the Tobacco Plains Journal, which began publication in
August of 1903. Under the Timber and Stone and Homestead laws, applicants were
required to publish a notice of their intent to make final proof in the newspaper nearest to
their land; for claims that came up for proof before the Journal went into print, these
notices would have come out in some other regional paper. Unfortunately, back issues for
the Kalispell Inter Lake and the Western News of Libby, the two closest weeklies to the
Plains that preceded the Journal, are largely unavailable for the time before 1903,
meaning this information is most likely lost.
However, 103 (73%) of the relevant Timber and Stone claims were published in
the timeframe of this study, as well as 22 (69%) of the Commuted Homesteads. Between
these two datasets, 267 total witnesses are named, of which 187 (70%) occur in at least
one of the local historical sources. Combining this information (when available) with the
previous analysis regarding claims sold within six months of final certificate is revealing:
90% of ELC, 80% of Huebschman, 67% of J. Neils, and 92% of Brown witnesses appear
in the lists, while only 41% of those connected with Dollie M. Bush do. Anderson
purchased his claims too early for witness information to appear in the paper.
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The information regarding who may have been an employee of one of the lumber
companies is much more limited and heavily biased toward Eureka Lumber Company
since they were the only truly “local” enterprise operating in the area. Only one name
related to BFLC, a cruiser named John F. Norbey, is mentioned in the Tobacco Plains
Journal, and he does not appear as a claimant, witness, or anything else associated with a
land claim. In terms of ELC, only five claimants are named anywhere as an associate of
the company, and only two of them sold their claims within six months. One, Ira M.
Baker, transferred his to William F. Brown, who in turn passed it along to BFLC.
William S. Walter’s claim, however, found its way to ELC a mere 10 days after final
certificate via James E. McPherson. The Polk Directory offers better results, yielding an
additional eight claimants who were employed by Eureka; again, only two of these sold
their claims within six months, and just one—Charles Ablen—ever saw his land go to
ELC.
Very few witnesses are listed as lumber company employees: In the Journal, only
nine names appear, nearly half of them also being claimaints. The Polk Directory again
offers up more at 15, but this only amounts to 0.06% of the total number of witnesses.
Among the 81 people who made first purchases of land claims five are given as ELC
workers, and from the 144 individuals who sold land to lumber companies (including
original claimants) there are 10.
One interesting piece of information, though perhaps less reliable than others
since it was essentially self-reported, is the location provided for each claimant and
witness within the notices published in the newspaper. Out of 216 patentees, the most
common place of residence given was Eureka at 45, followed by Kalispell at 39; the third
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most popular was Fortine with 9. Only one person came from a location outside of
northwest Montana, and that was Spokane (Figure 7). The witness results are
proportionate to this, except that no locations are given outside of the state; the furthest
one came from Marion, 70 miles south of Eureka. 94 witnesses hailed from Eureka, 83
from Kalispell, and 45 from Fortine, with the bulk of the remainder also residing in the
Tobacco Plains (Figure 8).

Claimants Appearing as Witnesses for Each Other, or as Professional Witnesses
Out of all the purchasers who bought their claims within six months of final
certificate, only Dollie M. Bush, Eureka Lumber Company, and the Brown family
acquired claims wherein some of the claimants appeared as witnesses for others within
the same group. This last detail seems pertinent, as groups of people who witnessed for
each other but ultimately sold off to different people may have just been friends helping
each other out rather than colluding together to facilitate fraud. In order to simplify the
data in each group of purchases only those witnesses who appeared on at least two
different sets of final proofs are included in the analysis, unless they also happened to be
one of the claimants.
Among the 16 ELC tracts four witnesses are also named as claimants—Carl S.
Brown, Ernest F. White, Peter S. Doxsie, and William H. Bartlett. Of these, only Brown
and Bartlett appear for other applicants, in this case each other. Dollie M. Bush’s
purchases, however, yield seven such witnesses: Alexander McDonald, Elliot B. Bratt,
and John A. Lindblom—whose Timber and Stone applications were filed together—show
up exclusively on one another’s proofs, as do Alexander Kirk and David Hoover. Claude
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Figure 7 – Self-Reported Claimant Locations

Figure 8 – Self-Reported Witness Locations
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M. and Daisy Jump also make a reciprocal pair, though they were likely married, and
Joseph E. Gangner, who has no other apparent connection to the either of them, also
appears for both. The lynchpin that connects at least five of the claimants together,
though, is George W. Bush; presumably Dollie’s husband, brother, or father—and not an
applicant himself—Bush served as witness for McDonald, Bratt, Lindblom, Kirk, and
Hoover. Edward R. Beck and C.H. Marantette, also not claimants, both appeared for Kirk
and Hoover as well.
The Brown family is an interesting case, because only one witness within the
tracts they actually purchased was also claiming land. However, the largest portion of the
total acreage they later sold to BFLC was actually taken out between themselves, and
they came out in force for each other. Altogether six members of the family applied for
Timber and Stone patents, and Peter A. Costich, a son-in-law, was a witness for all of
them; Orrin E. Rhodes, another son-in-law, appeared for five. Waverly L. Brown and
William F. Brown showed up repeatedly on others, as did two presumably unrelated
people—Victor Baney and Henry B. Lue. In fact, these six accounted for all but one of
the witnesses named in each of their claims. It is also noteworthy that while none of the
Brown family claims were sold within six months of receiving final certificate, they were
all applied for within the span of December 4-6, 1905, received their final certificates on
February 24, 1906, and sold to Bonners Ferry Lumber Company on January 25, 1907 for
the $2500 (except for William F. Brown, who included an additional 160-acres and
received $5000).
Concerning witnesses who appear multiple times across many different claims,
there are in fact 23 different people who show up at least 10 times. At the top of this list
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is Edwin W. Hamilton of Fortine, who was a witness on 53 Timber and Stone Claims,
followed by George A. Drake and Samuel C. Misner—also from Fortine and frequently
named alongside Hamilton in proofs—who occur 37 and 35 times, respectively. Enos
Campbell, a well-known personality in Eureka, was witness on 23 Timber and Stone
proofs, and George W. Bush of Kalispell served on 19 (clearly his business extended well
beyond what he conducted with Dollie). However, these are counting all of the Timber
and Stone claims which were published in the Tobacco Plains Journal between 1903 and
1909; paring this number down to just those sold to the lumber companies tells a very
different story. Hamilton is only listed 5 times here, while Drake and Misner come up on
just 4. Enos Campbell, however, appears 14 times, though not for any particular person or
company; if he was “working” as a land witness, then it was probably for anyone who
would pay. Of the 23 who had appeared 10 or more times overall, only Arthur F. Stahl,
Peter A. Costich, Orrin E. Rhodes, Arthur T. Purdy, Waverly L. Brown, and Alfred Baker
occur more than four times amongst future lumber company claims, and none show up
more than eight.
The situation with commuted homestead witnesses is much more subdued.
Eugene Maguire tops the list of all entries with 13 appearances, followed by Enos
Campbell with seven; only five people are listed more than five times. Concerning
commuted claims sold to lumber companies, six different people are tied for first place
with three listings each.

Contiguity of Holdings
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Looking at Tobacco Plains timber holdings from the perspective of the purchasing
lumber companies—ELC, BFLC, and JNLC—the geographic groupings of land are
obvious (Figure 9). J. Neils’ assets are primarily scattered throughout T34N R26W, near
Fortine and the Great Northern railroad line, while Bonners Ferry’s lands are tightly
packed together in T36N R28W above the Kootenai River. Eureka Lumber Company’s
holdings are clustered in large blocks around the key areas they were working: Along
Fortine Creek and the Tobacco River, around Glen Lake (which they logged using a 3mile flume that transported the timber down to the Tobacco), and in the mountains south
of Eureka which they eventually penetrated with their logging railroad. However, it
seems natural that these companies should strive to purchase lands contiguous with each
other, regardless of how they were acquiring them.
Looking back at the landscape through the lens of claims that were sold within six
months of final certificate reveals that numerous contiguous arrangements plainly exist
(Figure 6). The Huebschman family holdings form a solid bar around the northern end of
Thirsty Lake, and the Dollie M. Bush claims extend in an unbroken line for three miles to
the west of Trego. The Brown family purchases are only loosely grouped together west of
the Huebschman’s, but when combined with their own personal claims they too are
densely packed together (Figure 10). Anderson’s acquisitions are only roughly
contiguous, and J. Neils’ at first glance seem widely dispersed; however, when
considered alongside all of Bush’s tracts (as well as the rest that he would shortly
purchase) they fit into the puzzle quite nicely (Figure 10). ELC’s parcels also appear
rather randomly distributed, but most are in fact contiguous with the large numbers of
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Figure 9 – Landholdings of the Three Major Lumber Companies
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Figure 10 – All Claims Sold Within Six Months by Purchaser; Large Purchasers. Includes
other holdings by ELC, J. Neils, and the Brown Family
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previously filed claims they were also picking up soon after they began operations
(Figure 10).
As time carried on and other individuals such as Charles H. Poss, Fred E. French,
and Frank J. Lebert began amassing timber lands—which they often quickly sold to one
of the lumber companies—everyone tended to purchase tracts that were closely grouped
together. Many of these large holdings were acquired years after they were patented, and
do not fall within the scope of this study other than to note their place in the chain of
ownership. Yet, whether fraudulent or not, they stand to attest to the fact that contiguity
was important to anyone who was investing in Tobacco Plains timber.

Commutation Period
Misuse of the commutation clause was a hallmark of any tale of homestead fraud.
The five years’ residence required of the standard homestead act was far too long a time
to work effectively for anyone looking to obtain land illicitly; the only way to minimize
the risk of getting caught was to convert the claim to a cash purchase as early as possible.
After Congress passed the General Revision Act in 1891, the period after which this was
permissible was set at 14 months after the initial filing. If commutation fraud was
occurring in the Tobacco Plains, a rash of cash payments at or near the minimum
allowable time should be reflected in the historical records.
A total of 58 (53%) commuted homesteads tallied for this study were not
converted to cash for more than 20 months, 43 of which took over two full years (Figure
11). Only six achieved this status at the 14-month benchmark, while nine did so at 15 and
another six at 16. Three different claims, strangely, are listed as commuted well before
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Figure 11 – Number of Commutations by Length of Commutation Period

Figure 12 – Number of Commutations by Length of Commutation Period;
Commuted Homesteads Sold to Lumber Companies
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reaching the legal limit; one, converted after 13 months, was filed on September 6, 1905,
the day T33N R26W opened to entry, and so likely reflects past occupation counting
toward the required total. The others, however—commuted at 12 and three months—lie
within townships opened years before their respective filing dates. As of now, this
anomaly remains unexplained.
Out of 109 commuted homesteads, only 32 (29%) were sold to one of the lumber
companies. 14 (44%) of these did not undergo commutation for more than 20 months,
with 10 taking longer than two years (Figure 12). Just 11 (34%) claims were converted
before 16 months, yet only three of them were then sold to anyone within another six
(Figure 13). One of these was taken by John LaCroix, which he commuted at 14 months
and then sold the very same day to F.M. Lucas for $600, or $3.75 per acre—a mere $2.50
above the government rate. While this claim might appear as a potentially clear-cut case
of homestead fraud, Lucas sold it back to LaCroix barely a month later for $660. It did
not become the property of ELC for another year, when LaCroix went delinquent on his
property taxes and the company picked up the entire tract for a total of $8.76. Four
additional commuted homesteads were sold within six months of receiving final
certificate, but just one—that of Frank Baney, later the longtime sheriff of Lincoln
County—was commuted in less than two years. He paid for his claim after 20 months and
then sold it the very next day to his neighbors, Marie and Conrad Huebschman, for $700.

Major Rushes for Land at the Opening of New Townships
An important phenomenon of the timber craze which Puter and Stevens (1908:8384; see Chapter 3) described vividly as it occurred in Oregon (and that Curry-Roper

111

Figure 13 – Homesteads Commuted Within 16 Months, Period Between Final Certificate
and First Sale
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(1989:72) reiterated within her study of the Timber and Stone Act in Minnesota), was the
land rush. As timber lands increased in value the efforts placed into acquiring them grew
proportionately, until it became a common site throughout the Pacific Northwest to see
lines forming for blocks outside the local land office when a new township plat was
posted for entry. If forest lands were in such high demand in the Tobacco Plains—as the
Journal certainly believed they were (Tobacco Plains Journal 1903a, 1903e, 1903f,
1904a, 1904b, 1904d, 1904e, 1904k, 1904n, 1905f, 1905g, 1906s, 1908d)—large
numbers of claims should appear in the GLO tract books on or very shortly after the date
each new area opened up.
Six townships demonstrate the vast majority of settlement and land grabbing
activity: T36N R28W, T36N R27W, T36N R26W, T35N R26W, T34N R26W, and
T33N R26W. T36N R26W and the northern half of T36N R27W constitute the true
“Tobacco Plains,” the open, rolling prairie that drew most of the Euroamerican
population and held the major towns and villages, such as Eureka. Both of these areas,
plus the southeast quarter of T36N R27W, were first officially “open” on August 4, 1894,
though settlers had been piling in for some years prior. This was, of course, long before
the arrival of the Great Northern and the beginnings of the lumber industry, so it is not
surprising that the first claims were actually filed well over a month later—probably
whenever the claimants could finally arrange a trip to Kalispell.
T35N R26W and T34N R26W, the locations of the other major pockets of
population in the Plains Country such as Marston, Harrisburg, Fortine, and Trego, were
also opened quite early, on March 26, 1896. The first claim filed in T34N R26W was
established very shortly after, on March 30, 1896—a non-commuted homestead
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belonging to Charles M. Walker—but the next did not come until March of 1899. It took
over two months for the first entry to appear in T35N R26W. The remaining segments of
the settlement belt—the east half of T36N R28W, the southwest quarter of T36N R27W,
and T33N R26W—were not posted at the land office until September 6, 1905. In T36N
R28W there were 11 applications filed on that date, all of which were homesteads: Six
were non-commuted, three commuted, and two were later relinquished. No Timber and
Stone claims were filed for until November of 1905 and only seven were on the books by
the end of the year, six of them going to members of the Brown family. Only two
additional commuted homesteads were filed before November.
The southwest quarter of T36N R27W saw one claim filed two days after it
opened, a non-commuted homestead belonging to John Shenefelt. The next to appear was
another five-year homestead taken by Ora Fluharty on October 19, 1905. The first
commuted homestead was not on record until November of that year, and the first Timber
and Stone claim came in December. T33N R26W presents a slightly different situation:
Six applications are recorded for opening day, four of which are commuted and the other
two relinquished homesteads. Seven claims were filed the following day, September 7,
1905, comprising three commuted, two non-commuted, and three relinquished
homesteads. Out of the nine claims that appeared during the rest of 1905, only one in
November was a Timber and Stone. The preponderance of commuted homesteads early
on in this township is interesting, but it is likely simply a reflection of established settlers
desiring to gain legal title to their lands as quickly as they were able; only Ivar
Ingebretsen, John LaCroix, and John M. Olson converted their claims to cash entries as
soon as was possible, and between them John LaCroix was the only one to swiftly sell.
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None of the townships inside the study area experienced a genuine “rush” when
the lands first became available, but certain periods of time saw far more activity than
others. Though data concerning Timber and Stone initial filing dates is incomplete—this
information is only available in the published final proof notices that begin in late 1903—
the years 1904 and 1905 each saw around 25 applications, mostly arranged along the
Great Northern railroad to make cutting and delivering railroad ties easy. In 1906 this
number jumped to 202, more than four-times the previous two years combined. 56% of
these claims were located in T33N R26W and T34N R26W, areas that were for the most
part inaccessible from the railroad. By 1907 the number of filings had dropped to 49,
falling again to 30 in 1908. No Timber and Stone applications whatsoever appeared in
1909. What led to the sudden and sustained spike?
It is not entirely clear why the demand for timber claims took off in January of
1906 instead of, say, September 1905, when several new townships opened up, or even
further back in May, when Bader and Bottum organized the soon-to-be Eureka Lumber
Company. Researchers such as Fredlund (1992) and Calvi (2004a) have long placed the
blame on the Forest Homestead Act, passed on June 11, 1906, assuming that speculators
and corporations seized the opportunity to infiltrate the much-maligned forest reserves
and steal their wood. However, this makes little sense; homesteads of any kind only
accounted for 43 entries in 1906, 16% of the total amount, and the first Forest Homestead
inside the study area did not appear until 1907. In fact, it would have been an
impossibility for the Forest Homestead Act to have had any impact for most of 1906—
not a single acre within the townships in question was included in a reserve until
September 18 of that year, when a large addition to the Lewis and Clark Reserve was
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temporarily withdrawn. Even then, aside from the large block covered by T 35N, 34N,
and 33N, R 27W and 28W, only a handful of sections in T36N R26W, T34N R26W, and
T33N R26W were affected.
In reality, the sudden burst of timber land grabbing in 1906 was likely the result
of three different forces: (1) The activities of the Eureka Lumber Company, (2) the
establishment of new forest reserves—especially the Cabinet Forest Reserve—and (3)
Congressional efforts to repeal the Timber and Stone Act. The Tobacco Plains Journal
was active in reporting all of these things to its readers (Tobacco Plains Journal 1905i,
1905j, 1906a, 1906b, 1906c, 1906d, 1906e, 1906f, 1906h, 1906i, 1906k, 1906m, 1906p,
1906q, 1906t, 1906v, 1906x, 1906y, 1907a). ELC began purchasing timber by itself as
soon as they were on their feet, and even though there were few Timber and Stone claims
filed throughout their early existence in 1905 as Bader Lumber Company, the cumulative
effect of their initial efforts is evident by 1906: The company acquired their first 52
parcels of land between May and December of that year, over 40% of the total holdings
they ever possessed. Of the Timber and Stone claims included in this group, half of them
had been filed since January.
The announcement of the proposed Cabinet Forest Reserve soon after the
beginning of the year doubtless made a major psychological impact on the residents of
northwest Montana. Taking in nearly half of the remaining unappropriated territory in
Flathead County (which at that time included all of modern Lincoln County) in a swath
that stretched from the Idaho border to the Flathead Valley, the sudden loss of such a
major proportion of the area’s forest resources may have been the catalyst that set off the
ensuing land spree; this notion is supported by the fact that the month that saw the highest
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number of new claims, July, was also the one during which the Journal (1906p:1)
announced to its readers that another new forest reserve was likely to take in the Tobacco
Plains. This could not have been anything more than speculation at the time, informed by
recent events, yet it was prophetic: The new reserve was established in mid-September.
Throughout all of the uncertainty surrounding whether the local forests would even
remain open to entry, there were also constant reports regarding the fate of the Timber
and Stone Act (Tobacco Plains Journal 1906a, 1906f, 1906h, 1906k, 1907a), the repeal
of which seemed an almost certainty month in and month out. Between the new demand
for trees generated by ELC, the potential loss of the forest to the government at any
moment, the possible abolition of the most important timber land law of the time, and the
consistent reminders from the local paper that all of these factors could only serve to
make timber investments ever more valuable while they were available (Tobacco Plains
Journal 1906d, 1906i, 1906m, 1906r, 1906u, 1906w, 1906y, 1908a), it is little wonder
that people felt compelled to act while they could.
And yet, even with the relative explosion of activity compared with 1904 or 1905,
the events of 1906 could barely be considered a genuine “land rush.” Throughout the
course of the entire year only four months saw more than 20 Timber and Stone claims
filed in total, and only in July did the number creep above 30, reaching a peak of 39. For
11 months out of 12, the average number of claims filed per day was less than one. In
addition to this, no more than five applications were ever submitted on any one day, with
that high number only occurring twice; there were hardly lines around the block for
Tobacco Plains timber lands, regardless of the Journal’s assertions (1906t:1). In reality,
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while 1906 was significantly busier than usual, at no point did the land business reach the
level of a true frenzy.

Percentage of Total Claims Sold to Lumber Companies
Lumber companies purchased a total of 216 land claims within the study area, but
a full 53 of these reached final certificate before the Tobacco Plains Journal began
publication; this means that it is impossible to know just how many other Timber and
Stone, Homestead, and Commuted Homestead filings occurred alongside them that didn’t
fall into corporate ownership. Details available on the Bureau of Land Management’s
GLO records site and within the original GLO tract books can provide rough estimates of
these numbers, but they lack the finer detail available in the final proof publications,
particularly for Timber and Stone claims—the actual filing date is not recorded anywhere
else, nor are catalogs of unperfected entries.
However, the volume of data that is extant regarding all of the Timber and Stone
and Commuted Homesteads established between late 1903 and 1909 is still substantial,
and in fact covers the vast majority of land claims taken in the Tobacco Plains. As stated
previously, Non-Commuted Homesteads are not included in this analysis, since almost all
historical evidence points towards their having been, by and large, legitimate.
One-hundred and four Commuted Homestead entries taken inside the study area
appeared in the newspaper between September 1903 and June 1909, of which a mere 22
(21%) ended up as company holdings. During the same period entrymen published a total
of 340 Timber and Stone notices, with the lumber companies eventually acquiring 103
(30%). Though the Timber and Stone Act appears to have been preferred by both
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claimants and buyers alike, these numbers fall noticeably short of the 50% benchmark set
forth by the Public Lands Commission (Richards et al. 1905:63-65), especially
considering that 50 Timber and Stone claims were not sold at all within the first year, and
32 of these stayed with the original applicants for at least five.

Average Price Paid per Acre
According to Libecap and Johnson (1979:135), the average price paid by lumber
companies for fraudulently acquired timber lands in the Pacific Northwest averaged
around $6.00 per acre, a figure that stayed essentially the same between 1875 and 1903
and which did not differ substantially between the primary land laws. Assuming that this
amount would have also been roughly identical in the Tobacco Plains, it might be
reasoned that the local lumber companies would not have paid out significantly more
than this—and likely much less if they could—for illicitly gained acreage.
It is interesting to note up front that a number of different land transfers were
completed for the price of “$1.00 and other valuable considerations.” These types of
transactions were almost certainly designed to hide the actual amount of money that
exchanged hands, and as such do raise a certain amount of suspicion. Eureka Lumber
Company made 15 $1.00 purchases, though only four of them were also sold within six
months of final certificate; these were the State Land Patents purchased in Section 36 of
T34N R26W by Charles H. Poss, Emma M. Poss, May G. Murray, and Oscar M. Jenkins.
All four were taken on April 5, 1906, and sold to ELC within three days of each other:
Murray and Jenkins separately on September 4, and the Posses together on September 1
as part of a much larger, 2,000-acre transaction. With the exception of the claims in
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question, Poss purchased all of his lands between two to five years beyond their final
certificate date. Dollie M. Bush also dealt in five different $1.00 transactions, all of which
she acquired in less than six months.
Among all the major first purchasers who acquired their lands within the sixmonth window, the Huebschman’s paid the least at $6.38 per acre—although this only
included two claims. For more than half of Bush’s claims she nominally paid $1.00, but
for those that are listed at an actual price she averaged $8.71 an acre. Frans O. Anderson
did slightly better at $7.89, while the Brown’s shelled out the most for non-corporate
buyers at $8.91 per acre. ELC, as a first purchaser in this category, paid $8.19 an acre,
while Julius Neils landed his three claims at a relatively exorbitant $11.80.
Looking at overall purchases from bulk sellers—those who obtained and then sold
at least four individual claims together—as well as their own direct acquisitions reveals
that the local lumber companies were paying significantly more for timber lands than the
amount stipulated by Libecap and Johnson. Altogether, Bonners Ferry Lumber Company
paid out an average of $11.50 per acre, though their prices were slightly lower at $10.58
when buying land directly; secondary or tertiary purchases cost them $12.46. Eureka
Lumber Company’s statistics are nearly identical, with an overall average of $10.47 an
acre, direct purchases at $8.62, and second- or third-in-line prices coming out to $12.70.
Julius Neils, perhaps due to the shorter time frame he was buying in and the lower
number of claims, maintained remarkably consistent per-acre costs at $10.02, $10.21, and
$10.40, respectively.
Somewhat surprisingly, those within-six-months-of-final-certificate first
purchasers who sold their holdings to the lumber companies directly garnered some of
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the highest prices of all. The Huebschmans (who ultimately accumulated 1,400 of timber
just south of Eureka, which they held for over a decade), sold out for $15.36 per acre,
while the Browns—who only netted around $8.91 for the lands they actually purchased
from others—obtained $15.63 an acre for their own Timber and Stone claims. Dollie M.
Bush, however, only ranged from $8.50 to $9.38 to $10.83, depending on the particular
sale she made to J. Neils, coming out to an average of $9.38.

Sales Withheld from Record; Lumber Companies Taking Title on Second or Third
Purchase
Among the 216 eventual lumber company-held land claims, the initial transfers of
127 (59%) of them were placed on record less than one week after the sale date (Figure
14). 52 transfers were recorded within the span of a month, while 15 sales appeared on
the books in less than two months; 14 others took a maximum of six. Just one was
withheld from between six months and twelve months, and only four remained
unrecorded for longer than one year. Of the 90 exchanges that entered the record between
one day and one week, the largest portion appeared the day after the sale.
It is somewhat difficult to say for certain why 81 first purchasers did not record
their deeds for a period of at least week and up to six months after the transactions. In an
area like the Tobacco Plains, 70 miles removed from the county seat, it may purely be
that people did not make more trips of that distance than they had to; even though the
railroad made the journey relatively quick and easy, it was not free, and such excursions
still took up valuable time better spent farming, improving homesteads, hunting, or
earning wages. It is likely that discrepancies of even a month between a sale and its
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Figure 14 – Period Between First Sale and Filing of First Sale
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official filing could be accounted for by the buyers simply waiting to visit the courthouse
until they also had another reason to go to Kalispell; of the 52 that fall into this category,
only 11 (21%) were sold within six months of final certificate. However, this latter
number is actually high compared to the 29 deeds that were recorded between one and six
months: Only four (14%) of them sold so rapidly (Table 1). By comparison, 49 (39%) of
the sales filed in less than a week occurred inside this time frame, including all of Dollie
M. Bush’s, Julius Neils’, Frans O. Anderson’s, and the Brown family’s purchases and 6
(38%) of ELC’s.
Concerning when the lumber companies actually came into possession of their
lands, the largest group of purchases each for ELC and BFLC were those obtained
directly from the original claimant: 50 and 21, respectively. ELC’s holdings as second or
third purchaser collectively were higher at 62, but sat at 43 and 19 individually. Bonners
Ferry’s combined second- and third-in-line acquisitions were equal to its direct
accumulations, but similarly fell short of the first total at 17 and 4. Out of ELC’s total 62
second-hand purchases, 20 (32%) had been initially sold within six months,
proportionately identical to the rate of sales among their direct buys. BFLC did not make
any transactions with original owners within the six-month window, but one-third of their
subsequent purchases did fall into this category. Julius Neils, on the other hand, only
bought nine claims directly, but was second purchaser on 17 and third purchaser on 7. 11
(46%) of combined latter groups had been quickly sold after final certificate, as compared
to a 33% rate among his first-hand acquisitions.

Preliminary Conclusions from the Historical Analysis
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Based upon the historical analysis above, there are two fundamental ways of
viewing the degree of potential fraud in the Tobacco Plains. One is to consider all of the
claims that were sold within six months, as the rapidity of sale following final certificate
seems to be the essential factor identifying land fraud across all sources on the matter.
While many of these tracts were acquired by small, independent purchasers with no
apparent geographic, temporal, or social connections aside from the fact that either they
or a future owner sold them to a lumber company, this does not preclude them from being
fraudulent; it simply means that the nature of the arrangement between the claimant and
the buyer may have had nothing to do with timber. Archaeological survey and analysis on
any of these parcels might yield information regarding the practices of land fraud.
The other perspective is to look exclusively at those lands that appear to fall under
the purview of systematic fraud as a result of the full analysis presented above. Of these,
the holdings of Dollie M. Bush stand out: Bush predominantly purchased them within six
months from claimants without obvious local connections who by and large stood as
witnesses for each other, and then swiftly sold them to Julius Neils for relatively low
prices. No other dealer in Tobacco Plains timber lands so closely reflects the paradigm of
land fraud as traditionally understood in the Pacific Northwest. The Brown family
activities are also worthy of examination, but they differ from Bush’s in several important
ways: Each of the claimants (including themselves) were known local residents and the
family members received relatively high prices for their own claims, which they did not
sell them to Bonners Ferry Lumber Company for almost a year. The consistency with
which they appeared for each other as witnesses, however, and the fact that they sold out
simultaneously, does indicate organized collusion, but it may have been that they acted
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for their own benefit from the outset rather than for the company. None of the data
regarding the other large direct buyers of quickly-sold claims—including ELC, Julius
Neils, or the Huebschmans—indicate any particular relationships between themselves or
the claimants.

The Archaeology of Land Fraud in the Tobacco Plains

The Material Characteristics of Fraud
An archaeological examination of timber land fraud requires an understanding of
what kinds of physical materials might have existed as a direct consequence of landgrabbing activities. Establishing a benchmark regarding what fraud literally looked like
will allow for an analysis of the existing archaeological record to determine whether or
not it has left an identifiable signature that persists to today.
The historical literature regarding land fraud is almost unanimous in the assertion
that the Timber and Stone Act left behind little besides a paper trail (Richards et al. 1905;
Puter and Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909; Nelson 1909; Gates 1968; Yonce 1978; Libecap
and Johnson 1979; Curry-Roper 1989; Libecap 2007); the only outlier comes from Henry
S. Graves (1913:3-4), the second Chief of the Forest Service, who contends that
prospective Timber and Stone claimants would regularly build small cabins on their tracts
as a precaution in case other applicants tried to file for them before they could get to the
land office. This situation, however, only pertained to unsurveyed lands that might be
subject to a rush when they were finally surveyed and opened to entry, since actual
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settlers were given a preference right; considering that no Tobacco Plains Timber and
Stone entries were made within even the month that the townships were opened, it seems
highly unlikely anyone would have found this necessary.
The features of fraudulent homesteads, however, are well documented in most
existing sources and varied little regardless of the date or location (Richards et al. 1905;
Puter and Stevens 1908; Gannett 1909; Graves 1913, 1914; Gates 1968; Libecap and
Johnson 1979; Gordon 2014). The descriptions of small cabins—usually no bigger than
the legal requirement of 12 feet by 14 feet—put together in the simplest manner possible
and with very little evidence of occupation are ubiquitous; often constructed without even
nails, they were rarely chinked, daubed, or insulated in anyway, and frequently contained
no furniture other than the stumps of the trees cut down to build them. According to Puter
(1908:24), specially hired contractors sometimes built dozens of these cabins at the same
time after he had located numerous fraudulent homesteads together, causing all of them
to exhibit identical features and construction methods. He also suggests (135) that these
cabins never sat anywhere near the boundaries of the claim but were essentially hidden in
order to reduce the chances of being caught.
When scrutiny was high, however, such as it was before 1910 in the white pine
National Forests of northern Idaho when forest ranger Joseph Halm was investigating
June 11 claims, homesteaders sometimes took extra precautions to perpetuate the illusion
of occupation. According to Halm (Thompson 1944:84):

One cabin, on each of our periodical visits, had a comb and looking glass outside
the door; the ferns outside had been mowed down and to the casual passerby the
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cabin looked inhabited. The two small windows had a cloth over them so no one
could look in; a heavy chain and lock secured the door but to us it was easy. We
pulled the chain around, unhooked the hidden part and walked in. The interior
was lighted by the cracks through the shakes overhead which were only single
laid side by side and the rain and snow came straight through. The floor was
natural earth and the stubs of brush left in clearing the spot were still sticking up
in the middle of the cabin, as were chips made in the construction several years
before. A small shake table supported by two cleats drived between the wall logs,
a pile of dry boughs for a bed and a rusty tin stove comprised the complete
furnishings. We would take a piece of pine wood, write our names and the date on
it, put it in the rusty stove and to be sure it was always there on our return. After
taking careful note of dates, etc., we would close the door, hook the chain, pull it
around in place again and go our way. Old timers will remember those places
well, no clearings only the trees necessary for a 10'x12' cabin had been cut. The
cabins stood almost hidden by great ferns under beautiful giant virgin white pines
which were the prize sought by the timber homesteader who, except for a possible
fishing trip once a year or more likely every other year, never visited these claims.

Even this description, though, emphasizes the fact that the cabin itself was very shoddily
constructed. It also illustrates that, aside from the very small handful of items the
homesteader had conspicuously placed outside for effect, there were virtually no artifacts
present, a situation that rings true in other accounts as well. Considering the fact that the
law only required claimants to spend the last eight months of the commutation period
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actually occupying their homesteads, the Public Lands Commission (Richards et al.
1905:XVIII) observed that most cabins were clearly designed to only withstand the
warmer months of the year, and thus characterized the average commuted homestead as a
“summer outing.” George Neils (1976:9), son of Julius, called it “summer vacation in the
wild.”

Archaeological Survey and Sites in the Tobacco Valley
Out of 56 total land claims that were sold within six months of final certificate,
private owners today hold eight either partially or totally, which eliminates them from
consideration for archaeological analysis. Of the remaining 48, 41 were Timber and
Stone, with 15 having been previously filed as a homestead and then canceled or
relinquished. This means that in 54% of the potentially fraudulent land entries that are
available for survey in this study, there is little to no reason to expect any material culture
related to the claim itself to exist; this is well illustrated by the fact that, of the 19 known
historic sites that are inside any of the former Timber and Stone claims, only one
(24LN1808) is associated with a cabin. The remaining 17 include seven portable
sawmills, six historic dumps (three of which postdate the early logging era), a developed
spring from the 1940s, a railroad logging camp, a collection of springboard stumps, a
range fence, and a range corral. These sites have derived from past archaeological
surveys that cover 62% of the acreage within the accessible Timber and Stone tracts; 56%
of those parcels that were previously filed as homesteads have been surveyed (Figure 15;
Figure 16; Figure 17; Figure 18; Figure 19; Figure 20). An additional four claims were
State Land purchases that, like Timber and Stone entries, were simple cash sales that did

128

not require any kind of improvements. Of the four sites associated with them—all in
Section 36 of T34N R26W—three are large groupings of springboard stumps and the
fourth is a small log structure believed to be a pigpen from a logging camp. These parcels
have received 100% survey coverage (Figure 15; Figure 16; Figure 17; Figure 18; Figure
19; Figure 20)..
Altogether then there are only four commuted homestead claims in the study area
that were sold within six months and available for archaeological study. Three of them
are contiguous in T36N R27W, stretching between Thirsty and Othorp Lakes, but were
each initially purchased by a different party: Conrad Huebschman, Lewis E. Tuck, and
Fred E. French. Huebschman swiftly acquired Tuck’s tract alongside numerous others in
the immediate vicinity, but French held onto his and eventually added three neighboring
claims. Both sold out to ELC in 1919, when that company began punching their logging
railroad into the area. The last commuted homestead, the John LaCroix claim, is further
south in T33N R26W. Only two known sites exist within any of these parcels, though
collectively they boast 80% survey coverage: The first is the remains of a logging camp
(24LN857) above the banks of Fortine Creek in the northwest corner of the LaCroix
claim. The second site is a small, deteriorated cabin on the Isham Morgan claim
(purchased by Lewis E. Tuck) that will be discussed in a later section (Figure 15; Figure
16; Figure 17; Figure 18; Figure 19; Figure 20).
The existing archaeological data pertaining to fraudulent land claims simply does
not support a hypothesis that fraud as potentially practiced in the Tobacco Plains
involved any kind material deception. However, before dismissing the notion entirely it is
important to consider the taphonomic processes that may have impacted the integrity of
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Figure 15 – Archaeological Survey in T36N R28W
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Figure 16 – Archaeological Survey in T36N R27W
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Figure 17 – Archaeological Survey in T36N R26W
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Figure 18 – Archaeological Survey in T35N R26W
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Figure 19 – Archaeological Survey in T34N R26W
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Figure 20 – Archaeological Survey in T33N R26W
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Figure 21 – Forest Fire History in T36N R28W
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Figure 22 – Forest Fire History in T36N R27W
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Figure 23 – Forest Fire History in T36N R26W
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Figure 24 – Forest Fire History in T35N R26W
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Figure 25 – Forest Fire History in T34N R26W
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Figure 26 – Forest Fire History in T33N R26W
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sites to the point that they are undetectable today. Old cabins, often the only feature that
might be expected at a fraud site, are very often the target of firewood cutters since the
wood is exceptionally dry and easy to burn. They were also frequently the target of the
Forest Service, who for many years had an official policy to burn down decommissioned
or abandoned structures. Unfortunately, the agency did not keep records regarding when
and where structures were destroyed, and it is impossible to know just how many such
small cabins might have met their end in this fashion. Perhaps the biggest threat to
possible fraud-related sites—besides the natural decay that occurs in a forest
environment—has been forest fires; over 2800 acres of the above identified land claims
(33%) have burned since the turn of the twentieth century. However, approximately 70%
of the surveyed areas inside the claims have remained unscathed (Figure 21; Figure 22;
Figure 23; Figure 24; Figure 25; Figure 26).

Small Cabin Sites Associated with Potentially Fraudulent Claims: 24LN1808 and D3112SL

24LN1808
As previously noted, there are only two archaeological sites that lie within the
boundaries of one of the above identified potentially fraudulent entries. The first of them,
24LN1808, is located in the northwest portion of the Clara A. Stewart Timber and Stone
claim and consists of the remains of a 14-foot by 14.5-foot cabin, a four-foot diameter
outhouse pit, and a small dump containing a number of children’s toys. The cabin,
initially recorded in 1999, exhibited three remaining courses of logs and was
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saddle-notched at the corners. No evidence of chinking was present, and the logs
appeared to axe-cut on the ends. The original site recorders saw the toys as evidence of
the presence of children at the “homestead,” yet the truck, scooter, wagon wheel, race
car, airplane, and rifle that make up the collection—along with accompanying artifacts
such as Tang, Spam, Band-Aid, antifreeze, and Chef Boyardee cans—all considerably
post-date the supposed 1906-1907 period of occupation. The remaining artifacts—four
gallon-size cans and one matchstick condensed or evaporated milk can—are located
within the cabin itself, though they are not extensively described nor firmly dated; while
they seem to be linked with the cabin feature, the presence of so many more recent
intrusions in the nearby dump call any associations into question.
In this instance, the pervasive habit of past researchers to call any land claim a
“homestead” is not totally in error: Stewart did hold this parcel as an actual homestead
for a period of nearly seven months before relinquishing and refiling it as a Timber and
Stone entry. This practice was not totally uncommon: 12 different Timber and Stone
claims within the study area were previously held as homesteads by the same applicant.
In Stewart’s case, the date of relinquishment—June 28, 1906—also happened to be her
wedding date, five days before she moved to Portland (Tobacco Plains Journal 1906p); it
seems likely that she chose to simply acquire title to the land in the most direct way
possible since she would no longer be living on it. She sold the land to Waverly L. Brown
in January of 1907, who deeded it to BFLC the next day.
Since the various features and artifacts of this site cannot be securely associated
with each other, the site itself cannot be dated to any particular period. It is plausible that
the cabin feature relates to Stewart’s initial attempt at homesteading in the area, but the
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contents of the dump point toward subsequent episodes of use for a variety of different
purposes. It may be that the site as a whole is connected to later logging operations under
BFLC, or even independent cutting during the portable sawmill era; portable sawmills
were frequently family-run affairs, and the presence of children would not have been out
of place. In any case, Stewart’s initial filing of the claim as a homestead which she only
relinquished upon a major life change suggests that her efforts were genuine.
During fieldwork for this study in October of 2019, this site could not be
relocated. It is possible that the nearby forest fire of 2005 also burned into this area and
destroyed the remains of the cabin.

D3-112SL
The second site sits within the commuted homestead of Isham Morgan,
approximately 200 feet west of Thirsty Lake. Initially recorded during the 2019 field
season and recently updated in the spring of 2021, this site does not yet have a
Smithsonian Trinomial designation and is presented here under its temporary site
number: D3-112SL. The site consists of two features: the severely deteriorated sill logs of
an 11-foot by 12-foot cabin with saddle-notched corners and a 2.5-foot diameter pit
located adjacent to the cabin’s north wall (Figure 27; Figure 28). One lard or peanut
butter pail is situated just off the southeast corner of the structure and a badly crushed 43/8” diameter by 5” high can with an external friction lid was found to the inside the
eastern wall (Figure 29; Figure 30). No other visible artifacts are present on the surface,
but a metal detector registered numerous “hits” both inside the cabin and in two large
clusters to the east and west of the feature. The first locus is approximately 12-feet by 10-
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Figure 27 – Corner Notching on Cabin Feature at D3-112SL

Figure 28 – Pit Adjacent to Cabin Feature at D3-112SL
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Figure 29 – Pail at D3-112SL

Figure 30 – Crushed Can at D3-112SL
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Figure 31 – Cluster of Metal Detector Hits to NE of Cabin Feature at D3-112SL,
from inside Cabin at 80°

Figure 32 – Cluster of Metal Detector Hits to NE of Cabin Feature at D3-112SL,
toward Cabin at 219°
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Figure 33 – Cluster of Metal Detector Hits to SW of Cabin Feature at D3-112SL,
at 172°

Figure 34 – Cluster of Metal Detector Hits to SW of Cabin Feature at D3-112SL,
at 346°

148

feet in size and extends from the northeast corner to the midpoint of the eastern wall,
while the second is 25-feet by 13-feet and encompasses the entire area alongside the
western wall (Figure 31; Figure 32; Figure 33; Figure 34).
On the surface this site appears as an excellent candidate for a fraudulent
homestead; it is small with minimal surface artifacts and sits inside a commuted claim
that was sold within a month of final certificate. However, like 24LN1808, there is very
little available to accurately date the site. Though the remains of the cabin are now
extremely decayed and seem quite old, there is no evidence of any fallen walls or a roof
in the vicinity of the feature, suggesting that much of the original material was salvaged
for firewood in the distant past, leaving only the sill logs to weather the elements. If this
is true, it could also explain the widely dispersed presence of metal in the surrounding
soil, since any firewood cutters would have likely removed the nails from the wood and
left them wherever they fell. If the site was destroyed in this fashion, then the current
conditions do not preclude it from being an example of timber fraud—they just do not
happen to support that hypothesis. However, if the buried artifacts are shown to be cans,
tools, or other metal implements, the number of positive metal detector indications would
suggest that the site was occupied for a significantly longer period of time than would be
expected for a fraudulent homestead. This could be tested in the future if land
management activities warrant excavation.

Known Sites Previously Interpreted as Reflections of Fraud
While there is little archaeological evidence within those land claims identified as
potentially fraudulent to suggest that widespread homestead fraud existed in the Tobacco
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Plains, there are a number of sites located outside those claims that have been interpreted
that way by past researchers. In 1991 and 1992 GCM Services, Inc. conducted an
extensive archaeological inventory known as The Pinkham Report (Fredlund 1992) that
covered a majority of the current study area; within this project they identified four sites
(24LN1289, 24LN1291, 24LN1292, and 24LN1293) that they believed fit the pattern of
“…small log houses which were built in the woods by homesteaders to ‘prove up’ on
their land which they later sold to one of the timber companies” (Fredlund 1992:95).
Much of GCM’s research in this field was based upon the oral history accounts of George
Neils and Robert Thomas, both early employees of J. Neils Lumber Company in the
Libby area; the quote from Neils (1976:9) that “most of [the entrymen] built a small log
house and you can still find a few of those out in the woods where those people had their
summer vacation in the wild,” appears in almost every one of the above site forms in
some fashion or another, though usually broadly credited to “residents.” Thomas, for his
part, specifically names Bonners Ferry Lumber Company as a contractor for this type of
fraud but does not provide any details of archaeological relevance.

24LN1289
This site, situated on an island-like landform beside the Tobacco River, consists
of a 26-foot by 16-foot cabin with three remaining log courses on at least one side, 1/4”
split-pole chinking, and semilunate corner notching (a type of saddle notch used on logs
that have been split in half lengthwise (Glover 1982)). Describing the setting, the original
site recorder rather humorously states that “the location of the site is dark, damp and
gloomy. No human would ever live here unless she was running from the law.” Only one
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artifact was found during the initial investigations, a 11-3/4” high by 3-1/8” diameter
amber glass bottle believed to have contained an expensive liquor.
24LN1289 sits within the Timber and Stone claim of Albert Bergren, who
received his final certificate in March of 1902 but did not sell out until January of 1910,
when he transferred the land to George D. Hahn. Hahn only held the tract for two months
before selling again to Charles K. Chaffee of Gateway, who in turn passed it along to
Bonners Ferry Lumber Company in July of 1911. This was an unusual purchase for
BFLC, as the rest of their holdings on the east side of the Kootenai River were clustered
near Rexford, but it is likely that the company hoped to begin running timber down the
Tobacco as well, in direct competition with Eureka Lumber Company. GMC, ignoring
the length of time that the original claimant held the land—and unaware that it was, in
fact, a Timber and Stone entry—simply noted the connection to Bonners Ferry and, citing
the interview with Thomas, stated:

The Bonners Ferry Lumber Company had a policy of paying early settlers to build
a little cabin for the purpose of homesteading land. They then bought the land
from the homesteaders and logged it. The cabins built on the land for this purpose
were quite primitive and were not designed for long-term or permanent use
(Fredlund 1992:94).

Besides the obvious discrepancy with the claim type and the period of time under
Bergren’s ownership, a couple of details regarding the cabin itself also speak against it
having been fraudulent. The sheer size of the structure is far larger than would ever be
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expected from an intentionally minimalistic construction, but perhaps more importantly
the semilunate corner notching specified in the report suggests that the logs used to build
the walls were split in half. It is extremely unlikely that any homesteader seeking to
obtain land with the least amount of effort would expend such a large degree of energy to
do so. Unfortunately, like 24LN1808, this site could not be revisited to verify the details
of the original site report, since it lies on an isolated parcel of National Forest land
without any available public access.

24LN1291
24LN1291 comprises a single 17-foot by 15-foot cabin located along the
southwest shore of Lost Lake (Figure 35). Five log courses remain on the north wall—
which also includes the remains of the door opening and jamb—but the rest of the
structure is significantly deteriorated. Split-log chinking remains in place on the interior
walls, and the corner construction varies between saddle, double saddle, and a unique
combination of double saddle and V-notching (Figure 36; Figure 37). The original site
recorders noted window openings on three sides of the cabin, but upon reinvestigation in
November of 2020 each of these walls had tumbled down; evidence of windows today
only appears on the fallen eastern and southern sections (Figure 38). One green glass
wine bottle observed in 1991 could not be relocated; no other artifacts could be seen on
the surface.
A metal detector brought to the site in March of 2021 recorded numerous hits
inside and within one to two feet of the exterior cabin walls—these may reflect nails that
have fallen to the ground as the structure has deteriorated. However, beginning about five
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Figure 35 – Toward the SW Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1291 at 22°; Lost
Lake is in the Background

Figure 36 – Chinking Inside the NE Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1291, at 8°
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Figure 37 – Corner Notching on SW Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1291, at
292°

Figure 38 – Window Gap on Fallen East Wall of Cabin Feature at 24LN1291
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Figure 39 – Field of Metal Detector Hits Extending Uphill to North Wall of Cabin
Feature at 24LN1291, at 260°

Figure 40 – Field of Metal Detector Hits in Front of North Wall of Cabin Feature
at 24LN1291, at 258°
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feet to the north of the door opening and extending downhill toward the lake the detector
picked up a 24-foot by 35-foot field of subsurface metal that is consistent with the
expected location of a can dump—such items were often simply tossed haphazardly out
the door, and would accumulate wherever they landed (Figure 39; Figure 40). No positive
readings were marked in any other location aside from two at an outhouse pit first noted
in November of 2020, 65 feet to the east of the cabin.
Though the close proximity of this potential dump to the building does suggest
that this structure was never intended as a permanent home, it is also substantial enough
in size to indicate a lengthy period of occupation or reuse. The original recorders
mistakenly placed the site on the property of John B. Murphy, who purchased a small,
isolated tract on the opposite side of the lake at public sale in 1909, when it was actually
just within the northern limit of Raymond L. Woesner’s non-commuted homestead claim.
Woesner, an erstwhile ELC employee better known locally as a long-time forest ranger,
received his final certificate in December of 1906 but did not sell the land to ELC until
May of 1919. It was likely this error that caused GCM to include the site as another
“summer vacation in the wild” cabin. However, given the site’s setting up against a steep
embankment a few yards away from the lakeshore and poorly accessible from any other
part of the homestead claim, it is entirely possible that this cabin did serve as a summer
vacation home—just Woesner’s personal one.

24LN1292
This site is a cabin located about one mile west of Trego, and like 24LN1291 the
original site form features incorrect historical information that may have influenced
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GCM’s interpretation. The northern and eastern walls of the 14-foot by 11.5-foot
structure are virtually gone, as is the southern wall east of the door opening (Figure 41).
The remainder of the southern wall to the west remains in excellent shape and still boasts
seven courses of logs, while the western wall holds six at the southwest corner but
quickly deteriorates to the north (Figure 42). Most of the split-log chinking is still in
place, and two sets of dowel holes are bored next to the door on the inside of the south
wall that likely once supported shelves (Figure 43). The door jamb itself is far more
intricate than that found at any other site in the study, with a bent nail latch and a
specially cut wooden bar-stop still attached and a lengthy piece of custom-milled,
rounded grooved moulding fastened to the center near the place the door handle would
have been (Figure 44; Figure 45). The corners are V-notched (Figure 46).
Two large pits are also located at the site: One is eight-feet by 4-feet by 1.5-feet
deep and sits immediately adjacent to the east wall of the cabin, while the other is 6-feet
in diameter by 2-feet deep; the site form suggests that additional buildings may have sat
at these locations, though there is no immediate evidence to support this (Figure 47;
Figure 48). The original recorders reported “surprisingly few” artifacts, observing only a
handful of large cans and a piece of boot leather. All of these were re-found during recent
reinvestigations (Figure 49; Figure 50; Figure 51; Figure 52). Like at D3-112SL and
24LN1291, recent metal detector testing recorded a significant number of subsurface
artifacts, though at a far larger scale than at either of these other sites: a virtually
unbroken field of hidden metal envelops the cabin on all sides, extending from each wall
approximately 10 feet to the north, 16 feet to the west, 8 feet to the east, and 50 feet to the
south to the edge of the private property line (Figure 53; Figure 54; Figure 55;
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Figure 41 – Overview of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292 at 252°

Figure 42 – Overview of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292 toward NE Corner, at 205°
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Figure 43 – Dowel Holes and Chinking Inside South Wall of Cabin Feature at
24LN1292

Figure 44 – Bent Nail Latch and Custom Milled Moulding on Door Jamb of
Cabin Feature at 24LN1292
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Figure 45 – Wooden Bar-Stop to Inside of Door Jamb on South Wall of Cabin
Feature at 24LN1292

Figure 46 – Corner Notching on SW Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292, at
350°
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Figure 47 – Pit Adjacent to East Wall of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292, at 134°

Figure 48 – Pit to North of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292, at 236°
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Figure 49 – Crushed Sanitary Can Approximately 20 Yards South of Cabin
Feature at 24LN1292

Figure 50 – Barrel at NW Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292
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Figure 51 – Peeled-apart Pail on Inside of West Wall of Cabin Feature at
24LN1292

Figure 52 – Shoe Leather to South of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292
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Figure 53 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to West of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292,
at 90°

Figure 54 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to SW of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292, at
180°
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Figure 55 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to SW of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292, at
350°

Figure 56 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to South of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292,
at 318°
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Figure 57 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to South of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292,
at 130°

Figure 58 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to North of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292,
at 270°
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Figure 59 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to East of Cabin Feature at 24LN1292, at
298°

Figure 60 – Metal Kitchen Spoon Located with Metal Detector to SW of Cabin
Feature at 24LN1292
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Figure 56; Figure 57; Figure 58; Figure 59). Only one of these artifacts, an 11-3/4” long
kitchen spoon found 24 feet south of the cabin (Figure 60), broke the surface in any way,
though a 1-1/16” diameter hex nut was also found sitting on the surface just off the north
wall.
GCM believed this site to be on the land of Frederic Chadney, who within months
of receiving his patent sold it to Swan J. Dahlberg, a major landowner in the MarstonFortine area and a timberman in his own right. Chadney’s actual claim, however, is
nearly eight miles to the north of this location; the actual claimant was Charles L.
Wiggins, a homesteader who commuted his entry in December of 1903 and sold it to
Frank J. Lebert, a Kalispell mill owner, in May of 1906. Two and a half years is, of
course, well beyond what should be expected for a fraudulent claim, but even without this
historical evidence the archaeology of the site makes the point perfectly well on its own.
Though this cabin is amongst the smallest of all of the sites considered here, the level of
work and resources that went into small details like the door jamb are far from
minimalist, as is the choice of V-notching over the much easier saddle style. V-notches,
according to Glover (1982:171) were more efficient at shedding rainwater and
condensation, suggesting that the builder intended the structure to survive the elements.
The vast field of unseen artifacts, quite at odds with the impression of the original site
recorders, is also indicative of long-term use, particularly domestic objects like kitchen
utensils.

24LN1293
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This 20-foot by 15-foot cabin sits at the top of a low, flat ridge to the east of
Frank Lake, and is in a similar state of preservation as 24LN1292. The door opening is in
the western wall, and a significant amount of split-log chinking is still present in the
remaining walls (Figure 61; Figure 62). The corner construction, interestingly, begins
with V-notched logs at the base before transitioning to saddle-notches (Figure 63); it
seems possible that the builder decided the first style was too much work after
completing a few courses and switched to the easier method (Glover 1982). No artifacts
are noted on the surface outside the cabin walls, while inside there are three large cans:
One quart-sized can designed for an internal friction lid, one five-gallon drum, and a 2.5gallon spout-top gunpowder barrel that reads “American Powder Mills” along the top
(Figure 64; Figure 65; Figure 66). Metal detector results from March of 2021 indicate a
short-term occupation; as at other sites, numerous readings inside and immediately
outside the cabin walls may be nails that have accumulated during the decomposition of
the site, while a 6-foot by 3-foot cluster of hits marked 18 feet to the northwest of the
door suggests a habit hypothesized above at 24LN1291—the occupant, who was
apparently right-handed, was tossing their trash out the door when they were finished
with it (Figure 67; Figure 68).
Wallace E. Monk filed a Timber and Stone claim in this location in October of
1906, receiving his Final Certificate in January 1907. He held onto the tract for a year and
a half before selling it to Roderick Houston. Houston maintained his ownership for nearly
nine years, transferring the property to ELC in April of 1917. Since this particular parcel
was never filed as a homestead before Monk acquired it, there is no reason to believe that
the cabin located at this site was constructed to “prove up” on the land. While the period

169

Figure 61 – Toward Door Opening in West Wall of Cabin Feature at 24LN1293,
at 90°

Figure 62 – Chinking on Inside of NE Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1293 at
40°
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Figure 63 – Exterior of SE Corner of Cabin Structure at 24LN1293 showing Vnotching at the base transitioning to Saddle-notching higher up, at 304°

Figure 64 – Internal-friction-lid Can Inside Cabin Feature at 24LN1293
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Figure 65 – Five-gallon Drum Inside Cabin Feature at 24LN1293

Figure 66 – “American Powder Mills” Gunpowder Can Inside Cabin Feature at
24LN1293
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Figure 67 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to NW of Door Opening in West Wall of
Cabin Feature at 24LN1293, at 104°

Figure 68 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to NW of Door Opening in West Wall of
Cabin Feature at 24LN1293, at 270°
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of occupation does appear to have been short, the size of the structure is far larger than
what would expected at such a site, and the quality of the workmanship does not seem
particularly inferior to any of the other sites discussed so far. Though the visible artifacts
are limited, the presence of a gunpowder container and the ideal vantage point offered by
the location suggests the possibility that this site was a hunting cabin.

24LN1778
This site was not reported by GCM Services as a potentially fraudulent homestead
cabin, nor was it even included in the Pinkham Report. It is presented here, nonetheless,
to illustrate the variety of different interpretations to which small cabin sites can be
subjected. 24LN1778 is situated approximately one-half mile north of Marl Lake. The
structure measures 13-feet by 14.5-feet and consists of two to three log courses with Vnotched corners and a very small amount of split-log chinking (Figure 69; Figure 70;
Figure 71). The doorway is still identifiable on the west side, though this wall has almost
completely decayed, and one window is easily observed to the north (Figure 72; Figure
73). The original site form only lists one artifact, a one-gallon can with a triangular-cut
opening just outside the south wall; new investigations in September of 2020 identified
one additional can, badly crushed and unidentifiable, off the northeast corner, as well as a
sherd of amber bottle glass inside the cabin (Figure 74; Figure 75; Figure 76). Just as at
the other sites, the metal detector picked up a 7-foot by 10-foot cluster of metal extending
to the north from a point 13 feet west of the door opening (Figure 77; Figure 78). The
only other positive marks were inside the structure itself.
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Figure 69 – Toward South Wall of Cabin Feature at 24LN1778, at 352°

Figure 70 – V-Notching on Exterior of NE Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1778,
at 188°
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Figure 71 – Interior of NE Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1778 Showing a
Small Amount of Remaining Chinking, at 20°

Figure 72 – Door Opening in West Wall of Cabin Feature at 24LN1778, at 70°
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Figure 73 – Window Opening in North Wall of Cabin Feature at 24LN1778, at
18°

Figure 74 – Can With Triangular Cut Opening to South of Cabin Feature at
24LN1778
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Figure 75 – Crushed Can at NE Corner of Cabin Feature at 24LN1778

Figure 76 – Sherd of Amber Glass Inside Cabin Feature at 24LN1778
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Figure 77 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to NW of Door Opening in West Wall of
Cabin Feature at 24LN1778, at 18°

Figure 78 – Field of Metal Detector Hits to NW of Door Opening in West Wall of
Cabin Feature at 24LN1778, at 238°
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24LN1778 sits inside the homestead of Julius Halvorston, commuted in July of 1904 and
sold to Alfred Sherman Robinson two years later; Robinson kept the land until January
1919, when he sold it to ELC. Though the above archaeological and historical description
appears almost identical to those at 24LN1291 and 24LN1293, this site recorders here
interpreted it as a tie-hackers cabin, used during the winter months when transporting
both logs and finished ties was easier.

Concluding Thoughts
In reality, there is little evidence to suggest that 24LN1778 was a tie-hackers
cabin, just as there is little evidence to suggest that 24LN1289, 24LN1291, 24LN1292, or
24LN1293 were built in order to swindle the government out of its lands. None of these
sites contain enough information or integrity to say anything about them, other than that
they exist and someone, sometime, used them; they may have belonged to trappers,
prospectors, homesteaders, hunters, fishermen, loggers, forest rangers, ranchers,
criminals, or anyone else that occasionally needed a place to stay in the forest. Certainly,
no one would have thought twice about constructing what they needed on public land
during an era when the very idea of National Forests was still relatively new and
frequently disdained, and it is doubtful that they would have cared much more when the
lands belonged to the lumber companies.
The historical analysis of fraud in the Tobacco Plains revealed only one instance
of an individual appearing to engage in actual, organized conspiracy: Dollie M. Bush.
Unfortunately, virtually nothing is known about Bush; neither she nor her presumed
husband, George W. Bush, appear in any of the local historical sources. It is noted,
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however, that other Timber and Stone claims not sold to any of the lumber companies
also named George and several of the claimants featured in this study as witnesses; it
seems likely that their land business operated independent of Julius Neils, who simply
contracted to purchase a certain number of claims which the Bushes already had in the
works.
The activities of the Brown family, though plainly rife with collusion, were most
likely legal in a technical sense since they were apparently committed of their own
volition and without the obvious influence of the Bonners Ferry Lumber Company. In
either case, however, the law of choice was the Timber and Stone Act, the machinations
of which made no direct physical impact on the landscape. Archaeological analysis of
these areas, though in part incomplete, appears to verify this: Of the 55 historic sites
within Timber and Stone Claims in the study area, the two described in this paper are the
only ones featuring cabins that are not known to be related to later logging operations.
Concerning the small handful of commuted homesteads that came under scrutiny in this
study, only the Isham Morgan claim and site D3-112SL seem to fit the traditional model
of a fraudulent homestead. Even this, however, is impossible to confirm.
Lacking both historical and archaeological evidence of widespread land fraud in
the Tobacco Plains, what led to the belief that such events did occur? As stated
previously GCM Services leaned heavily on George Neils; in their form for 24LN1293,
they state that:

The site is associated with the early homestead period in the Kootenai
area….These homesteaders built small log cabins and lived in them long enough
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to establish ownership of the land. Residents still refer to the practice as "having
summer vacation in the wild". Often, once ownership of the land was established,
the people sold the land to the lumber companies in the area so it could be logged
(Fredlund 1992:95).

Clearly, they have exaggerated here, as it is likely that no one besides Neils ever actually
uttered this phrase. But how accurate was he in his memory?
It would seem, in fact, that he did not actually remember these events at all.
George Neils did not come to Montana until 1919, when he assumed the role of logging
supervisor in Libby for his father upon returning from World War I (Neils 1971; Neils
1976). Based upon his 1976 oral descriptions of J. Neils Lumber Company’s logging
operations down to the year, area, and machinery used, it is apparent that he was an
exceptionally intelligent person with an incredible memory for detail; however, when
speaking about the company’s early land acquisitions, he said, in full:

The timber that was available for purchase was mostly 160 acre tracts that were
owned by individuals that had proved up on their lands through the stone and
timber act which permitted an individual, I think he had to be l8 years plus, or 21
years plus, I'm not sure about that, permitted an individual to stake out his claim
on 160 acres, all in one piece, not only in Montana but in most of the Northwest
and after complying with certain
regulations that had to do with proving up as they called it. Proving up meaning
that he would get a title to the land from the United States government. He then
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had to report at the land office regularly, I think it was a period of three years
before he was able to prove up and he had to stand a certain amount of time each
year on the premises. Most of them built a small log house and you can still find a
few of those out in the woods where those people had their summer vacation in
the wild (Neils 1976:9).

To put it bluntly, in this case it is obvious that Neils had no idea what he was talking
about. He begins by naming the Timber and Stone Act, but then provides a very cloudy
and erroneous description of the requirements of the Homestead Act as it only existed
after 1912. No part of his statement is factually correct; it is plain that he is simply
repeating what he has heard from someone else. Other sources on the history of the
Tobacco Plains area are similarly confused on the subject of land law: Madeline Utter, in
Pinkham Pioneers (2006), refers to almost every land entry she discusses as a “Stone and
Timber,” even though all were actually genuine homestead claims.
Were the understandings of people during the era of land fraud equally blurred?
The answer, in short, is no: Local newspapers kept their readers very well updated with
the latest land-related information, and the Tobacco Plains Journal was no exception
(1903b, 1903g, 1903h, 1903i, 1903j, 1903k, 1903l, 1904f, 1904g, 1904h, 1904i, 1904j,
1904l, 1904o, 1905a, 1905b, 1905c, 1905e, 1905f, 1905h, 1905l, 1906a, 1906b, 1906e,
1906f, 1906g, 1906h, 1906j, 1906k, 1906l, 1906n, 1906o, 1906q, 1906s, 1906t, 1906z,
1907a, 1907c, 1907d, 1908d, 1908g, 1908h). As time has passed, however, it seems that
the actual memories of this period of time have drifted away and been replaced by
something else, something that in more recent years has caused Neils (1976), Thomas
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(1980), Fredlund (1992), Miss (1994), Flanagan (2003), and Calvi (2004a) to all recall an
era where fraud was a rule in the forests of the Kootenai.
Such stories were, of course, true elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest. Based upon
data presented in Gates (1968:602), use of the Timber and Stone Act plummeted in all
regions of the United States after 1909 and never recovered. By the time that George
Neils first came to Libby to begin a 40-year career in the forests of northwest Montana in
1919, the land-buying frenzy in the greater region had been over for a decade; intimate
knowledge of how the process worked was simply something he never had to be familiar
with. If a mere ten-year gap is enough to obscure the realities of timber land acquisition
for a man who devoted his life to the lumber industry, it is perhaps unsurprising that later
writers attempting to explain the situation in the Kootenai area would—whether
consciously or unconsciously—turn to the more lurid and well-known tales from the
Pacific Slope to fill in the gaps where true memory failed.
Authors such as Puter and Stevens (1908), Pinchot (1937), (Ise (1920), Hibbard
(1924), Cameron (1928), and Gates (1968) have remained fundamental in studies of
United States land issues, whereas contemporary local sources like the Tobacco Plains
Journal—ever the booster—had little to say on the subject at home. Very few small-scale
accounts of fraud, in fact, appear anywhere in the existing literature; even recent
contributions like Franzen (2020), devoted in all other aspects to a differential regional
analysis of the lumber industry, treats land fraud as if it were a universal trait that
remained fundamentally the same in any setting. This trend is pervasive in general
histories on the topic; as stated by Howard Ottoson (quoted in Curry-Roper 1989:71),
"land policy history includes some mythology, and much attention to the legislative acts;
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inadequate attention has been paid to how the policies actually operated.” As a result of
such mythologizing, actual events occurring in specific locations like the Cascade
Mountains have been uprooted, generalized, and inserted into the memories of every
lumbering landscape, whether they belong there or not.
This wholesale replacement of local memory with a sort of national folklore can
also be explained, in part, by the larger role that land fraud played in the development of
American land policy. As explored in Chapter 3, even the rumor of fraudulent activities
in the West was enough to spur occasional Congressional action to amend or repeal the
laws that were deemed most responsible. It was also enough to drive early conservation
efforts aimed at protecting the remaining forests from falling into the maw of the everhungry lumber industry, culminating in the Forest Reserve Act of 1891. By the time that
Theodore Roosevelt rose to the presidency a decade later, the establishment of forest
reserves had become the primary method whereby the government battled timber fraud;
as the Tobacco Plains Journal (1906z:8) quoted an unnamed Forest Service official after
four additional reserves were created in Montana at the end of 1906: “It was simply a
race between the government and land thieves as to who should get there first.”
The origins of the Forest Service are thus closely tied to the issue of land fraud; it
is very unlikely that the modern National Forest system would even exist without it. As
President Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot set out on a mission that ultimately resulted in
the establishment of 150 new forest reserves—including the Kootenai—they necessarily
entwined fraud into the history of every single one of them, whether it had truly existed
there or not. Every local citizen knew why the government was creating National Forests;
they had little else to explain them other than admitting that illicit activities must have
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permeated their own timber as well. Roosevelt and Pinchot succeeded in saving enough
of the country’s forests to put an end to the “Great Barbecue,” but in doing so helped
perpetuate the rumors of rampant timber fraud on the West Coast far beyond their points
of origin. These stories infiltrated and replaced local histories just as the National Forests
replaced the open public domain; only studies such as this can break down the resultant
“mythology” and set the story straight once again.
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